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boundary="000000000000acaff405c938d359" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 11 Aug 2021 20:26:36 +0000 Cc: lightning-dev <lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>, Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Removing the Dust Limit X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 18:39:55 -0000 --000000000000acaff405c938d359 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable ZmnSCPxj, what you are describing is pretty much what Litecoin is doing with MWEB. Basically MimbleWimble (which has CT) with extension blocks. If you are interested: https://github.com/litecoin-project/lips/blob/master/lip-0002.mediawiki https://github.com/litecoin-project/lips/blob/master/lip-0003.mediawiki Sorry to derail the conversation with non-Bitcoin stuff. =F0=9F=98=80 - Charlie On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 5:38 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Good morning Billy, et al., > > > For sure, CT can be done with computational soundness. The advantage of > unhidden amounts (as with current bitcoin) is that you get unconditional > soundness. > > My understanding is that it should be possible to have unconditional > soundness with the use of El-Gamal commitment scheme, am I wrong? > > Alternately, one possible softforkable design would be for Bitcoin to > maintain a non-CT block (the current scheme) and a separately-committed C= T > block (i.e. similar to how SegWit has a "separate" "block"/Merkle tree th= at > includes witnesses). > When transferring funds from the legacy non-CT block, on the legacy block > you put it into a "burn" transaction that magically causes the same amoun= t > to be created (with a trivial/publicly known salt) in the CT block. > Then to move from the CT block back to legacy non-CT you would match one > of those "burn" TXOs and spend it, with a proof that the amount you are > removing from the CT block is exactly the same value as the "burn" TXO yo= u > are now spending. > > (for additional privacy, the values of the "burn" TXOs might be made into > some fixed single allowed value, so that transfers passing through the CT > portion would have fewer identifying features) > > The "burn" TXOs would be some trivial anyone-can-spend, such as > `<saltpoint> <0> OP_EQUAL OP_NOT` with `<saltpoint>` being what is used i= n > the CT to cover the value, and knowledge of the scalar behind this point > would allow the CT output to be spent (assuming something very much like > MimbleWimble is used; otherwise it could be the hash of some P2WSH or > similar analogue on the CT side). > > Basically, this is "CT as a 'sidechainlike' that every fullnode runs". > > In the legacy non-CT block, the total amount of funds that are in all CT > outputs is known (it would be the sum total of all the "burn" TXOs) and > will have a known upper limit, that cannot be higher than the supply limi= t > of the legacy non-CT block, i.e. 21 million BTC. > At the same time, *individual* CT-block TXOs cannot have their values > known; what is learnable is only how many BTC are in all CT block TXOs, > which should be sufficient privacy if there are a large enough number of > users of the CT block. > > This allows the CT block to use an unconditional privacy and computationa= l > soundness scheme, and if somehow the computational soundness is broken th= en > the first one to break it would be able to steal all the CT coins, but no= t > *all* Bitcoin coins, as there would not be enough "burn" TXOs on the lega= cy > non-CT blockchain. > > This may be sufficient for practical privacy. > > > On the other hand, I think the dust limit still makes sense to keep for > now, though. > > Regards, > ZmnSCPxj > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --000000000000acaff405c938d359 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <div dir=3D"ltr">ZmnSCPxj, what you are describing is pretty much what Lite= coin is doing with MWEB. Basically MimbleWimble (which has CT) with extensi= on blocks. If you are interested:<div><a href=3D"https://github.com/litecoi= n-project/lips/blob/master/lip-0002.mediawiki">https://github.com/litecoin-= project/lips/blob/master/lip-0002.mediawiki</a><br></div><div><a href=3D"ht= tps://github.com/litecoin-project/lips/blob/master/lip-0003.mediawiki">http= s://github.com/litecoin-project/lips/blob/master/lip-0003.mediawiki</a><br>= </div><div><br></div><div>Sorry to derail the conversation with non-Bitcoin= stuff.=C2=A0=F0=9F=98=80</div><div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"= class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"l= tr">- Charlie<br></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_= quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 5:38 A= M ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfou= ndation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>> wrote:<br></div>= <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-= left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Good morning Billy, et al= .,<br> <br> > For sure, CT can be done with computational soundness. The advantage o= f unhidden amounts (as with current bitcoin) is that you get unconditional = soundness.<br> <br> My understanding is that it should be possible to have unconditional soundn= ess with the use of El-Gamal commitment scheme, am I wrong?<br> <br> Alternately, one possible softforkable design would be for Bitcoin to maint= ain a non-CT block (the current scheme) and a separately-committed CT block= (i.e. similar to how SegWit has a "separate" "block"/M= erkle tree that includes witnesses).<br> When transferring funds from the legacy non-CT block, on the legacy block y= ou put it into a "burn" transaction that magically causes the sam= e amount to be created (with a trivial/publicly known salt) in the CT block= .<br> Then to move from the CT block back to legacy non-CT you would match one of= those "burn" TXOs and spend it, with a proof that the amount you= are removing from the CT block is exactly the same value as the "burn= " TXO you are now spending.<br> <br> (for additional privacy, the values of the "burn" TXOs might be m= ade into some fixed single allowed value, so that transfers passing through= the CT portion would have fewer identifying features)<br> <br> The "burn" TXOs would be some trivial anyone-can-spend, such as `= <saltpoint> <0> OP_EQUAL OP_NOT` with `<saltpoint>` being= what is used in the CT to cover the value, and knowledge of the scalar beh= ind this point would allow the CT output to be spent (assuming something ve= ry much like MimbleWimble is used; otherwise it could be the hash of some P= 2WSH or similar analogue on the CT side).<br> <br> Basically, this is "CT as a 'sidechainlike' that every fullnod= e runs".<br> <br> In the legacy non-CT block, the total amount of funds that are in all CT ou= tputs is known (it would be the sum total of all the "burn" TXOs)= and will have a known upper limit, that cannot be higher than the supply l= imit of the legacy non-CT block, i.e. 21 million BTC.<br> At the same time, *individual* CT-block TXOs cannot have their values known= ; what is learnable is only how many BTC are in all CT block TXOs, which sh= ould be sufficient privacy if there are a large enough number of users of t= he CT block.<br> <br> This allows the CT block to use an unconditional privacy and computational = soundness scheme, and if somehow the computational soundness is broken then= the first one to break it would be able to steal all the CT coins, but not= *all* Bitcoin coins, as there would not be enough "burn" TXOs on= the legacy non-CT blockchain.<br> <br> This may be sufficient for practical privacy.<br> <br> <br> On the other hand, I think the dust limit still makes sense to keep for now= , though.<br> <br> Regards,<br> ZmnSCPxj<br> _______________________________________________<br> bitcoin-dev mailing list<br> <a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br> <a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" = rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br> </blockquote></div> --000000000000acaff405c938d359--