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[166.173.249.195]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i128sm464247ywf.17.2017.06.15.20.09.40 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 15 Jun 2017 20:09:41 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-9822C79C-F5C0-4049-AD09-03695279C77A Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Eric Voskuil X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (14F89) In-Reply-To: Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 06:09:33 +0300 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <8999832B-BD81-415A-9CA5-0DE397A1A904@voskuil.org> References: <31040BE1-64ED-4D05-BCBE-E80BC7B9A182@gmail.com> <95BB8EA8-31F6-4131-B557-A35342FA17A1@voskuil.org> To: Erik Aronesty X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HTML_MESSAGE, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 15:21:35 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Demonstration of Phase in Full Network Upgrade Activated by Miners X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 03:09:48 -0000 --Apple-Mail-9822C79C-F5C0-4049-AD09-03695279C77A Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Seems functional as a way for the economy to signal, but signaling is only a= n expression of intent to participate, not actual participation. One can sig= nal and then not participate, as we see with hash rate signaling. Today we see people complaining about miner control, because hash rate is ce= ntralized. Tomorrow we are likely to see people complaining about economic c= ontrol, as its centralization continues. So imagine a few web wallets/APIs signaling based on their ownership of the m= ajor fraction of value. Can potential splitters safely rely on these signals= ? The wallets have a voice because they participate. Consider also that user activated soft forks are not followed by unmodified n= odes (on the presumption of minority hash rate support that necessitated the= economic activation). In other words, they exhibit the categorical behavior= of hard forks (incompatibility). So to the extent that the economy has cont= rol, it is only over the ability to hard fork (split the chain). e > On Jun 15, 2017, at 9:38 PM, Erik Aronesty wrote: >=20 > > How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. But= what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the fork= ? >=20 > I had proposed earlier and maintain that "UTXO bits" can be used to allow c= oordinated user participation activation thresholds akin to other hashpower t= hresholds. =20 >=20 > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.ht= ml >=20 > While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or was just too c= omplicated and concerned with compression at the expense of readability), I a= m fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - would be a reasona= ble way for users to coordinate changes independently of miners and with ver= y high consensus levels. >=20 >=20 >> On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >>> On Jun 14, 2017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin wrote:= >>>> Hi Jameson: >>>>=20 >>>>> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJam= eson Lopp =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev wrote: >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> > =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8C= Gregory Maxwell =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A >>>>>> > >>>>>> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> > The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly, and not jus= t >>>>>> > miners, is specifically described in the white paper (section 8, >>>>>> > paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence). This is >>>>>> > critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with the current >>>>>> > degree of centralization in pools. Without it, Bitcoin's security >>>>>> > would look a lot more like the Ripple system. >>>>>> > >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> =E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C=E9=83= =BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A=9B=E5= =BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5= =B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7= =E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=A2= =AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB=96=E4= =BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5=E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81=9A=E5=87=BA= =E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4=B8=8D=E6=98= =AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4=E7=9A=84=E7= =AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89 >>>>>> Yes, users always have choice that they can abandon the nodes. This B= IP does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean only the one(especially wallets) t= hat=E2=80=99s passive, they need to know there=E2=80=99s a choice and pick o= ne. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> =E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4= =BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD=95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=8A= =EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8= =A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5= =85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C=E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C= =E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA= =9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82 >>>>>> This BIP can be applied to almost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segw= it2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upgrade is not the key point. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> =E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A=84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98= =AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F >>>>>> Did the users have any real choice? >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> =E6=88=91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB= =AC=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=E5= =B0=B1=E5=83=8F=E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=BD=86= =E6=8B=92=E7=BB=9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=AF= =B9=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=E7=BB=93=E6= =9E=9C=E3=80=82 >>>>>> I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as they= do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade. >>>>>=20 >>>>> To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democracy - if you find yourself using t= he term "voting" then you may be misunderstanding how consensus forms. Once a= feature has been vetted and the code is deployed, miners may signal that th= ey are ready to enforce new rules. If for some reason miners are too "passiv= e or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation of the new rules, users may choo= se to circumvent said veto by refusing to accept blocks that do not show rea= diness for enforcing the new rules. >>>>=20 >>>> How does the users show their opinion? They can fork away and leave. Bu= t what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united users or the for= k? >>>>=20 >>>> I agree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could= you kindly suggest an other word for that? >>>>=20 >>>> I think users should have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you ag= ree with this or not? >>>>=20 >>> Regarding consensus changes, users can voice their opinion on any number= of communication platforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to= signal their intentions at the protocol level, every proposal for doing tha= t to date has been arguably flawed. >>=20 >> There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus at the pro= tocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequitable in= the context of Bitcoin. >>=20 >> The only "problem" with it is that people are not satisfied with having a= voice limited to their participation. People are used to political systems i= n which they vote using their existence as power, not their participation, a= nd they expect some subset of existing human bodies to control all others. T= his is the concept of some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more= powerful voice than either their proportional existence or individual parti= cipation would allow. >>=20 >> Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. It is a market, not a sta= te. The only choice you have is to participate or leave. If you are satisfie= d with others participating in your stead, you have left the consensus - you= have no say. >>=20 >> Most people who think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never= participated or long ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these p= eople now grope for a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your say= on consensus, but you cannot take it away from others. >>=20 >> To have your say regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received= in exchange for something else of economic value. To have your say regardin= g soft forks you must mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks cannot co= ntrol miners' selection of transactions and miners cannot control the econom= y's determination of what is valid. If one wants a say in either one must pa= rticipate in the respective operation. >>=20 >> e >>=20 >>> Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky if not completely impossi= ble, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Bitcoin users do no= t voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rules. >>>=20 >>> Most attempts at measuring user consensus would probably be best describ= ed as signaling rather than voting given that the act of doing so has no act= ual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a fully validating node i= s free to enforce the rules with which the agree regardless of what rules ot= her entities are enforcing.=20 >>>>> =20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> =E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89=E6=8B= =A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E5= =A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC= =E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8=BF=87=E5=88= =86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82 >>>>>> This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the 51% m= ajority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their fork that get rid= of miners. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> =E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97=A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF= =A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4= =B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5= =E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E3=80=82 >>>>>> If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote f= or upcoming protocol upgrade. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> =E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8=E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF= =94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6= =88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6=9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=90= =E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E6=98= =AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89=E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4= =B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF=B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0= =E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4=BB=BB=E3=80=82 >>>>>> So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, holders, servi= ce provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of miners as de= signed in the white paper? >>>>>>=20 >>>>> =20 >>>>> There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point - the white p= aper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with regard to determ= ining the correct chain within the context of many possible /valid/ chain fo= rks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the correct chain a= mongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain forks. Bitco= in ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any other enti= ty) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to enforce. >>>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 tempo= rarily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they dislike t= he idea, they can leave as always. >>>>=20 >>> =46rom my understanding, if the only change miners make is to stop confi= rming transactions that have a version less than X then it should be a soft f= ork, yes.=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Regards >>>>=20 >>>> LIN Zheming >>>>=20 >>>=20 >>> _______________________________________________ >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>=20 >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >>=20 >=20 --Apple-Mail-9822C79C-F5C0-4049-AD09-03695279C77A Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Seems functional as a way f= or the economy to signal, but signaling is only an expression of intent to p= articipate, not actual participation. One can signal and then not participat= e, as we see with hash rate signaling.

Today we see= people complaining about miner control, because hash rate is centralized. T= omorrow we are likely to see people complaining about economic control, as i= ts centralization continues.

So imagine a few web w= allets/APIs signaling based on their ownership of the major fraction of valu= e. Can potential splitters safely rely on these signals? The wallets have a v= oice because they participate.

Consider also that u= ser activated soft forks are not followed by unmodified nodes (on the presum= ption of minority hash rate support that necessitated the economic activatio= n). In other words, they exhibit the categorical behavior of hard forks (inc= ompatibility). So to the extent that the economy has control, it is only ove= r the ability to hard fork (split the chain).

e

On Jun 15, 2017, at 9:38 PM, Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:

> How does the users show their opinion? T= hey can fork away and=20 leave. But what remains will be united. Are you afraid of the united=20 users or the fork?

I had proposed earlier and maintain tha= t "UTXO bits" can be used to allow coordinated user participation activation= thresholds akin to other hashpower thresholds.  

https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.h= tml

While I'm not certain that my implementation was correct (or w= as just too complicated and concerned with compression at the expense of rea= dability), I am fairly certain that this mechanism - or a similar one - woul= d be a reasonable way for users to coordinate changes independently of miner= s and with very high consensus levels.


On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 1:04 AM, Eri= c Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda= tion.org> wrote:


On Jun 14, 2= 017, at 9:55 PM, Jameson Lopp via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linu= xfoundation.org> wrote:

<= div dir=3D"ltr">

On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 11:29 AM, Zheming Lin <heater@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Jameson:

=E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8815=E6=97=A5=EF=BC=8C01:20=EF=BC=8CJa= meson Lopp <j= ameson.lopp@gmail.com> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A

=


On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 9:39 AM, Zheming Lin= via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists= .linuxfoundation.org> wrote:


> =E5=9C=A8 2017=E5=B9=B46=E6=9C=8814=E6=97=A5= =EF=BC=8C02:11=EF=BC=8CGregory Maxwell <greg@xiph.org> =E5=86=99=E9=81=93=EF=BC=9A
>> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 2:23 AM, Zheming Lin via bitcoin-dev
> &= lt;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> The enforcement of the system's rules by users broadly= , and not just
> miners, is specifically described in the white paper (= section 8,
> paragraph 2, it especially clear in the last sentence).&n= bsp; This is
> critical for the security of Bitcoin especially with th= e current
> degree of centralization in pools.  Without it, Bitco= in's security
> would look a lot more like the Ripple system.
><= br>
=E6=98=AF=E7=9A=84=EF=BC=8C=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=B0=B8=E8=BF=9C= =E9=83=BD=E6=9C=89=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E5=B9=B6=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E6=8A= =9B=E5=BC=83=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B=E8=8A=82=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA B= IP =E5=B9=B6=E6=B2=A1=E6=9C=89=E5=8F=8D=E5=AF=B9=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E7=94=A8=E6= =88=B7=E8=BF=99=E4=B9=88=E5=81=9A=E3=80=82=E5=8F=AA=E6=9C=89=E9=82=A3=E4=BA=9B= =E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=EF=BC=8C=E4=BB= =96=E4=BB=AC=E9=9C=80=E8=A6=81=E7=9F=A5=E9=81=93=E5=BF=85=E9=A1=BB=E5=81= =9A=E5=87=BA=E4=B8=80=E4=B8=AA=E9=80=89=E6=8B=A9=E3=80=82=EF=BC=88=E8=80=8C=E4= =B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E8=A2=AB=E5=8A=A8=E7=9A=84=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E9=BB=98=E8=AE=A4= =E7=9A=84=E7=AD=96=E7=95=A5=EF=BC=89
Yes, users always have choice that t= hey can abandon the nodes. This BIP does=E2=80=99t go against them. I mean o= nly the one(especially wallets) that=E2=80=99s passive, they need to know th= ere=E2=80=99s a choice and pick one.

=E8=BF=99=E4=B8=AA BIP =E5=8F=AF= =E4=BB=A5=E8=A2=AB=E5=BA=94=E7=94=A8=E4=BA=8E=E5=87=A0=E4=B9=8E=E4=BB=BB=E4=BD= =95=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E4=B8=8A=EF=BC=8C=E5=8C=85=E6=8B=AC=E9=9A=94=E7= =A6=BB=E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E7=9A=84=E9=9A=94=E7=A6=BB= =E8=A7=81=E8=AF=81=EF=BC=8C=E4=B8=A4=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE=B9=EF=BC=8C= =E6=B6=8C=E7=8E=B0=E5=85=B1=E8=AF=86=EF=BC=8C=E5=85=AB=E5=85=86=E6=89=A9=E5=AE= =B9=E7=AD=89=E3=80=82=E4=BD=86=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=8D=87=E7=BA=A7=E5=B9=B6=E4= =B8=8D=E6=98=AF=E9=87=8D=E7=82=B9=E3=80=82
This BIP can be applied to alm= ost any upgrade, including Segwit, Segwit2x, 2m, ec, 8m=E2=80=A6 but the upg= rade is not the key point.

=E5=88=B0=E5=BA=95=E6=88=91=E4=BB=AC=E7=9A= =84=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9C=9F=E7=9A=84=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E9= =80=89=E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=9F
Did the users have any real choice?

=E6=88= =91=E5=B9=B6=E4=B8=8D=E8=83=BD=E7=90=86=E8=A7=A3=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E7=9B=B8=E4= =BF=A1=E5=A4=A7=E9=83=A8=E5=88=86=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=88=E5=B0=B1=E5=83=8F= =E5=BD=93=E5=89=8D=E4=B8=80=E6=A0=B7=EF=BC=89=EF=BC=8C=E4=BD=86=E6=8B=92=E7=BB= =9D=E8=BF=99=E4=BA=9B=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E5=AF=B9=E5=8D= =8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E7=9A=84=E6=8A=95=E7=A5=A8=E7=BB=93=E6=9E=9C=E3= =80=82
I don=E2=80=99t see the reason they trust the majority miners(as t= hey do today) but refuse the vote for upcoming protocol upgrade.
<= /blockquote>

To be clear, Bitcoin is not a democrac= y - if you find yourself using the term "voting" then you may be misundersta= nding how consensus forms. Once a feature has been vetted and the code is de= ployed, miners may signal that they are ready to enforce new rules. If for s= ome reason miners are too "passive or lazy" or wish to "veto" the activation= of the new rules, users may choose to circumvent said veto by refusing to a= ccept blocks that do not show readiness for enforcing the new rules.

How does the users show th= eir opinion? They can fork away and leave. But what remains will be united. A= re you afraid of the united users or the fork?

I ag= ree with you that the =E2=80=9Cvote=E2=80=9D is not accurate. Could you kind= ly suggest an other word for that?

I think users sh= ould have choice to follow the miners or not. Do you agree with this or not?=

Regarding consens= us changes, users can voice their opinion on any number of communication pla= tforms. Though if you're looking for a way for users to signal their intenti= ons at the protocol level, every proposal for doing that to date has been ar= guably flawed.

There is exactly one way to express one's opinion on consensus a= t the protocol level - participation. The method is neither flawed nor inequ= itable in the context of Bitcoin.

The only "problem= " with it is that people are not satisfied with having a voice limited to th= eir participation. People are used to political systems in which they vote u= sing their existence as power, not their participation, and they expect some= subset of existing human bodies to control all others. This is the concept o= f some ruling over others, which gives the rulers a more powerful voice than= either their proportional existence or individual participation would allow= .

Bitcoin exists in defiance of political models. I= t is a market, not a state. The only choice you have is to participate or le= ave. If you are satisfied with others participating in your stead, you have l= eft the consensus - you have no say.

Most people wh= o think they are participating in Bitcoin have either never participated or l= ong ago left the consensus. Having surrendered it, these people now grope fo= r a way to have their say. You can always reclaim your say on consensus, but= you cannot take it away from others.

To have your s= ay regarding hard forks, you must validate Bitcoin received in exchange for s= omething else of economic value. To have your say regarding soft forks you m= ust mine. Everyone has these options. Hard forks cannot control miners' sele= ction of transactions and miners cannot control the economy's determination o= f what is valid. If one wants a say in either one must participate in the re= spective operation.

e

Measuring meatspace consensus is pretty tricky i= f not completely impossible, especially given the fact that the vast majorit= y of Bitcoin users do not voice any opinions on the matter of consensus rule= s.

Most attempts at measuring user consensus would p= robably be best described as signaling rather than voting given that the act= of doing so has no actual power to affect consensus. Every user who runs a f= ully validating node is free to enforce the rules with which the agree regar= dless of what rules other entities are enforcing. 
 

=E5=AF=B9=E9=92=B1=E5=8C=85=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E7=9A=84=E9=80=89= =E6=8B=A9=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF= =A1=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E3=80=82=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4= =BB=AC=E4=B8=8D=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=EF=BC=8C=E5=8F=AF=E4=BB=A5=E9=80=9A=E8= =BF=87=E5=88=86=E5=8F=89=E6=9D=A5=E6=B6=88=E9=99=A4=E6=8E=89=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5= =E3=80=82
This choice for wallet users right now, is wether to follow the= 51% majority miners. If they don=E2=80=99t, they can have their fork that g= et rid of miners.

=E5=A6=82=E6=9E=9C=E4=BB=96=E4=BB=AC=E4=BB=8D=E6=97= =A7=E7=9B=B8=E4=BF=A1=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E9=82=A3=E4=B9=88=E5=8F=AF=E4= =BB=A5=E7=95=99=E4=B8=8B=E6=9D=A5=E5=B9=B6=E8=B7=9F=E9=9A=8F=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5= =E5=B0=86=E6=9D=A5=E7=9A=84=E5=8D=8F=E8=AE=AE=E6=94=B9=E5=8F=98=E3=80=82=
If they do trust the majority miners, they stay and follow the vote for u= pcoming protocol upgrade.

=E6=89=80=E4=BB=A5=E9=97=AE=E9=A2=98=E5=9C=A8= =E4=BA=8E=EF=BC=9A=E6=AF=94=E7=89=B9=E5=B8=81=E7=9A=84=E5=BC=80=E5=8F=91=E8=80= =85=E3=80=81=E7=94=A8=E6=88=B7=E3=80=81=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E6= =9C=8D=E5=8A=A1=E6=8F=90=E4=BE=9B=E8=80=85=E3=80=81=E7=94=9A=E8=87=B3=E7= =9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=EF=BC=8C=E6=98=AF=E5=90=A6=EF=BC=88=E4=BB=8D=E7=84=B6=EF=BC=89= =E5=A6=82=E7=99=BD=E7=9A=AE=E4=B9=A6=E4=B8=AD=E6=8F=8F=E8=BF=B0=E7=9A=84=E5=AF= =B9=E5=A4=A7=E5=A4=9A=E6=95=B0=E7=9F=BF=E5=B7=A5=E6=8B=A5=E6=9C=89=E4=BF=A1=E4= =BB=BB=E3=80=82
So the questions is: Do the bitcoin developers, users, ho= lders, service provides, even miners, (still) have faith in the majority of m= iners as designed in the white paper?

=  
There is a fundamental misconception regarding this point -= the white paper refers to majority hashpower needing to be honest with rega= rd to determining the correct chain within the context of many possible /val= id/ chain forks. It is not referring to using hashpower to determine the cor= rect chain amongst an infinitely variable number of currently invalid chain f= orks. Bitcoin ecosystem participants should not have faith in miners (or any= other entity) when it comes to choosing the consensus rules they wish to en= force.


Arrrgh. I think in the BIP, the miners just invalids tx version 1 tempora= rily. That=E2=80=99s a =E2=80=9Csoft fork=E2=80=9D right? If they dislike th= e idea, they can leave as always.

=46rom my understanding, if the only change miners make is to s= top confirming transactions that have a version less than X then it should b= e a soft fork, yes. 

R= egards

LIN Zheming

=

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