Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Xb7Ys-00010U-E9 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 06 Oct 2014 12:38:46 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from wp059.webpack.hosteurope.de ([80.237.132.66]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1Xb7Yq-0004nX-UP for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 06 Oct 2014 12:38:46 +0000 Received: from wsip-70-165-172-128.lv.lv.cox.net ([70.165.172.128]); authenticated by wp059.webpack.hosteurope.de running ExIM with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) id 1Xb7JX-0005Cx-K2; Mon, 06 Oct 2014 14:22:55 +0200 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 \(1878.6\)) From: Tamas Blummer In-Reply-To: Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 05:22:51 -0700 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: References: <5431CD8D.7050508@certimix.com> To: Mike Hearn X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1878.6) X-bounce-key: webpack.hosteurope.de; tamas@bitsofproof.com; 1412599125; 21f22d3f; X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [80.237.132.66 listed in list.dnswl.org] X-Headers-End: 1Xb7Yq-0004nX-UP Cc: Bitcoin Development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] The Bitcoin Freeze on Transaction Attack (FRONT) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 06 Oct 2014 12:38:46 -0000 Note that the problem might arise also by a bug / accident and not as an = attack. Since value spent is not part of the signature it is easy to create an = arbitrary fee by a defective wallet software. Collecting that huge fee might provide a higher incentive to miner than = the block subsidy on the trunk. Assuming miner are fully rational, they might even form a temporary = coalition to claim the fee: The miner who mines forking block might offer part of the fee gained in = a similar transaction to other miners, so they help to extend his fork. A sufficiently high stake = could trigger a long fork =93battle=94 of ad-hoc coalitions. Addressing the known bug of the signature hash, that it does not include = the value spent, would have other positive effects, e.g. for resource limited hardware = wallets. Interpretation of an OP_NOP for a value hashing signature check were = suggested by Alan Reiner discussed earlier on bitcointalk. Tamas Blummer=