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From: Jean-Paul Kogelman <jeanpaulkogelman@me.com>
In-reply-to: <0E15E07E-E21C-4541-869A-3C34CBA35774@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 09:42:12 +0800
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	<42BF7FEB-320F-43BE-B3D9-1D76CB8B9975@gmai> <l.com@mac.com>
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	<DEF9C610-2FBC-40C1-9AFA-9E91903C7F96@petertodd.org>
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To: Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail.com>
Cc: Jean-Paul Kogelman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin Core and hard forks
Precedence: list

Miners could include their fee tiers in the coinbase, but this is obviously o=
pen to manipulation, with little recourse (unless they are a pool and miners=
 move away because of it).=20

In any event, I think that trying out a solution that is both simple and inv=
olves the least number of parties necessary is preferable.

Have miners set their tiers, have users select the level of quality they wan=
t, ignore the block size.

Miners will adapt their tiers depending on how many transactions actually en=
d up in them. If for example they set the first tier to be $1 to be included=
 in the current block and no user chooses that level of service, they've obv=
iously priced themselves out of the market. The opposite is also true; if a t=
ier is popular they can choose to increase the cost of that tier.

jp=20

> On Jul 24, 2015, at 9:28 AM, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> I suppose you can use a timelocked output that is spendable by anyone you c=
ould go somewhat in this direction=A1=ADthe thing is it still means the wall=
et must make fee estimations rather than being able to get a quick quote.
>=20
>> On Jul 23, 2015, at 6:25 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman <jeanpaulkogelman@me.com>=
 wrote:
>>=20
>> I think implicit QoS is far simpler to implement, requires less parties a=
nd is closer to what Bitcoin started out as: a peer-to-peer digital cash sys=
tem, not a peer-to-let-me-handle-that-for-you-to-peer system.
>>=20
>> jp
>>=20
>>> On Jul 24, 2015, at 9:08 AM, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> By using third parties separate from individual miners that do bidding o=
n your behalf you get a mechanism that allows QoS guarantees and shifting th=
e complexity and risk from the wallet with little computational resources to=
 a service with abundance of them. Using timelocked contracts it=A1=AFs poss=
ible to enforce the guarantees.
>>>=20
>>> Negotiating directly with miners via smart contracts seems difficult at b=
est.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>> On Jul 23, 2015, at 6:03 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman via bitcoin-dev <bitcoi=
n-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>> Doesn't matter.
>>>>=20
>>>> It's not going to be perfect given the block time variance among other f=
actors but it's far more workable than guessing whether or not your transact=
ion is going to end up in a block at all.
>>>>=20
>>>> jp
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>>> On Jul 24, 2015, at 8:53 AM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
>>>>>=20
>>>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>>>> Hash: SHA256
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> On 23 July 2015 20:49:20 GMT-04:00, Jean-Paul Kogelman via bitcoin-de=
v <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> And it's obvious how a size cap would interfere with such a QoS schem=
e.
>>>>>> Miners wouldn't be able to deliver the below guarantees if they have t=
o
>>>>>> start excluding transactions.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> As mining is a random, poisson process, obviously giving guarantees wi=
thout a majority of hashing power isn't possible.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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>>>>> iQE9BAEBCAAnIBxQZXRlciBUb2RkIDxwZXRlQHBldGVydG9kZC5vcmc+BQJVsYyK
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>>>>> =3DLY1+
>>>>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>=20