Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2EF8399F for ; Thu, 12 Oct 2017 15:42:05 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wm0-f68.google.com (mail-wm0-f68.google.com [74.125.82.68]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9C102442 for ; Thu, 12 Oct 2017 15:42:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wm0-f68.google.com with SMTP id b189so14240641wmd.4 for ; Thu, 12 Oct 2017 08:42:04 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=LVksH/ssloDUycUlYS61YGLMi8wVccBaybkl68gBctA=; b=oBT5hh/97iLI9blAYgV7QML/mVgmdhi2/2w6V6YhNWiYIQ5eE3Dk/L3t29EB+dJgOJ sACOpJq4WZXV/+SPdPh8HIBpC0ebKQfZsQg1lbLUXR10TQY4afenkxAi8nrRjevgdg4a ywNVofa3/ZUzDRvU9q+dWz66W/Egs9cQo1gkZmvu9SNT/Ns1UET/3NAmExID59UijcjW 742zUVnw1gO9eGQ5rdM68go9n9vN819FwngHzNUqTnQlqjabP2uWHc3D23B+8Sq73TuE 3bSwaZqom0gUPfypPWIxSptLsIZc/mkhLN1TACoubetYSj3WClQFyKQAwRVgDfKRlx4K Nt7Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=LVksH/ssloDUycUlYS61YGLMi8wVccBaybkl68gBctA=; b=rqWYh0U7ahCh6pCcGbenuaMScJoy+R3LOYKGJ8+zx2ut2tOxhWobp/gzePKWT9peuY V7OAxBrGinjhg+z5N2u+ZKCYhq5UiqExvGlC80HqbYmsfJynfjm14eoMuj+88viwEeYQ MQ3pAQtgMhGW2RM60rjZCGdU7Dd0/6G+nJoE22TUQ9VAwBlgSPJrSIX6NkLpc3o0+w1Z ss4+XM3LYGei+Bvn8y0wDHgbJmyIjyImUe+R/JgoI/uRA6Ws2gl9afxCR9ejCp5JICl/ W2y7RYZQCsdstKSogTOwVVSjQ2MzurQPw2TkAfhRsJWL601vXqHqAXwpwEqg5NnUn6uK 5lIg== X-Gm-Message-State: AMCzsaVjCFcUkeT7HOKZpe0dSiZk1asWhl882ttsWGXRoTyn20sqcpbu NWiYZ/VOl5m/MTsgYgkyptrNyOT+4EeRxXiJaWeMaQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AOwi7QABYN0fQIVSVFTk/Gl7jao505GU+WbI+KZZnmJuo3xB8sLLdDrv7S3gP4GGuKa1dnXSbECEk7e2niaX+jStV7U= X-Received: by 10.80.240.2 with SMTP id r2mr3271641edl.57.1507822922432; Thu, 12 Oct 2017 08:42:02 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.80.173.10 with HTTP; Thu, 12 Oct 2017 08:42:02 -0700 (PDT) From: Scott Roberts Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 11:42:02 -0400 Message-ID: To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.4 required=5.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=disabled version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 15:47:04 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] New difficulty algorithm part 2 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 15:42:05 -0000 ZmnSCPxj wrote: > Thus even if the unwanted chain provides 2 tokens as fee per block, > whereas the wanted chain provides 1 token as fee per block, if the > unwanted chain tokens are valued at 1/4 the wanted chain tokens, miners > will still prefer the wanted chain regardless. This is a good point I was not thinking about, but your math assumes 1/2 price for a coin that can do 2x more transactions. Holders like Roger Ver have an interest in low price and more transactions. A coin with 2x more transactions, 22% lower price, and 22% lower fees per coin transferred will attract more merchants, customers, and miners (they get 50% more total fees) and this will in turn attract more hodlers and devs. This assumes it outweighs hodler security concerns. Merchants and customers, to the extent they are not long term hodlers, are not interested in price as much as stability, so they are somewhat at odds with hodlers. Bitcoin consensus truth is based on "might is right". Buyers and sellers of goods and services ("users") can shift some might to miners via fees, to the chagrin of hodlers who have more interest in security and price increases. Some hodlers think meeting user needs is the source of long term value. Others think mining infrastructure is. You seem to require hodlers to correctly identify and rely solely on good developers. Whatever combination of these is the case, bad money can still drive out good, especially if the market determination is not efficient. A faster measurement of hashrate for difficulty enables the economic determination to be more efficient and correct. It prevents the biggest coin from bullying forks that have better ideas. Conversely, it prevents miners from switching to an inferior coin simply because it provides them with more "protection money" from fees that enables them to bully Bitcoin Core out of existence, even in the presence of a slightly larger hodler support. Devs are a governing authority under the influence of users, hodlers, and miners. Miners are like banks lobbying government for higher total fees. Hodlers are the new 1%, holding 90% of the coin, lobbying both devs and users for security, but equally interested in price increases. Users are "the people" that devs need to protect against both hodlers and miners. They do not care about price as long as it is stable. They do not want to become the 99% owning 10% of the coin or have to pay unecessary fees merely for their coin to be the biggest bully on the block. A faster responding difficulty will take a lot of hot air out of the bully. It prevents miners from being able to dictate that only coins with high fees are allowed. They are less able to destroy small coins that have a fast defense. The 1% and banks would starve the people that feed them to death if they were allowed complete control of the government. Are hodlers and miners any wiser? Devs need to strive for an expansion of the coin quantity to keep value constant which is the foundation of the 5 characteristics of an ideal currency. Therefore devs should seek peaceful and sustainable forks of bitcoin. This will enable constant value, security, and low transaction fees per coin transfer. Alts aside, the current situation of discouraging forks forbids constant value via limited quantity. It also forces a choice between high security and low fees. Forks with a faster difficulty will be more capable of retaining value. Users, devs, hodlers, and miners are naturally aligned and at odds in different ways. A flow chart of the checks and balances should enable better development towards a self-controlling feedback system, but the goals need to be known before it could be designed and implemented. Hodlers say price increases is the goal. Users say efficient transfer of value. Miners say fees (at least that's the end game after mining). I'm with users despite trying to be the 1% (which reminds me of a book about how people often vote based on feeling good about their morality and concern for society as a whole, despite it being contrary to their personal best interests if that vote wins.)