Message-ID: <54DCED6A.4030304@thinlink.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 10:14:02 -0800
From: Tom Harding <tomh@thinlink.com>
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To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
References: <20150212064719.GA6563@savin.petertodd.org>
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Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4
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On 2/11/2015 10:47 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> ... replace-by-fee ...

Replace-by-fee creates the power to repudiate an entire tree of 
payments, and hands this power individually to the owner of each input 
to the top transaction.  Presumably this is why the original replacement 
code at least required that all of the same inputs be spent, even if the 
original outputs got jilted.

Replace-by-fee strengthens the existing *incentive discontinuity* at 
1-conf, and shouts it from the rooftops.  There is diffraction around 
hard edges.  Expect more Finney attacks, even paid ones, if 
replace-by-fee becomes common.  Regardless of how reliable 0-conf can 
ever be (much more reliable than today imho), discontinuities are very 
undesirable.

There is no money in mining other people's double-spends.  Miners of all 
sizes would welcome a fair way to reduce them to improve the quality of 
the currency, whether or not that way is DSDW.  You mischaracterize DSDW 
as being in any way trust- or vote-based.  It is based on statistics, 
which is bitcoin-esque to the core.