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From: Chris Page <pagecr@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 20:21:58 -0500
Message-ID: <CAEG8yznS0OHSEM0e9WVtCvdmRzemHRyd4XCgXwY+x5sNiHghrA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Andrew Lapp <lapp0@purdue.edu>
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	<bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Request for comments on hybrid,
 PoW/PoS enhancement for Bitcoin
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 I definitely need to have an deeper understanding of that paper before
proceeding.   Thanks for the reference!

On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Andrew Lapp <lapp0@purdue.edu> wrote:

> Having stakeholders "endorse" blocks has, according to you, the benefits
> of increasing the number of full nodes and making a 51% attack more
> expensive. It seems to me it would have the opposite effects and other
> negative side effects. Any stakeholder that has "won" could just be running
> an SPV client and be informed by a full node that they have won, then
> cooperate to collect the reward. You are mistaking proof of stake as a
> proof you are running a full node. At the same time, the network becomes
> cheaper to attack in proportion to the amount of the block reward that is
> paid to "endorsers". Another side effect is that miners would have a bigger
> economy of scale. The more stake a miner has, the more they can "endorse"
> their own blocks and not others blocks. I recommend reading this:
> https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf
>
> -Andrew Lapp
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">=C2=A0I definitely need to have an deeper understanding of=
 that paper before proceeding. =C2=A0=C2=A0Thanks for the reference! =C2=A0=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb=
 25, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Andrew Lapp <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:l=
app0@purdue.edu" target=3D"_blank">lapp0@purdue.edu</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
r><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Having stakeholders &quot;endorse&quot; bl=
ocks has, according to you, the benefits of increasing the number of full n=
odes and making a 51% attack more expensive. It seems to me it would have t=
he opposite effects and other negative side effects. Any stakeholder that h=
as &quot;won&quot; could just be running an SPV client and be informed by a=
 full node that they have won, then cooperate to collect the reward. You ar=
e mistaking proof of stake as a proof you are running a full node. At the s=
ame time, the network becomes cheaper to attack in proportion to the amount=
 of the block reward that is paid to &quot;endorsers&quot;. Another side ef=
fect is that miners would have a bigger economy of scale. The more stake a =
miner has, the more they can &quot;endorse&quot; their own blocks and not o=
thers blocks. I recommend reading this: <a href=3D"https://download.wpsoftw=
are.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://download.wpsoftware.<u><=
/u>net/bitcoin/pos.pdf</a><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><b=
r>
<br>
-Andrew Lapp<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

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