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From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2016 04:37:29 +0000
To: James MacWhyte <macwhyte@gmail.com>,
	Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Message-ID: <82507740-C4A3-4AF2-BA02-3B29E5FECDE4@petertodd.org>
Cc: Jeff Coleman <jeff@ledgerlabs.io>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capital Efficient Honeypots w/ "Scorched Earth"
	Doublespending Protection
Precedence: list


On 24 August 2016 22:54:47 GMT-04:00, James MacWhyte <macwhyte@gmail.com> wrote:
>I've always assumed honeypots were meant to look like regular, yet
>poorly-secured, assets.

Not at all. Most servers have zero reason to have any Bitcoin's accessible via them, so the presence of BTC privkeys is a gigantic red flag that they are part of a honeypot.

> If the intruder could identify this as a
>honeypot
>by the strange setup (presigned, non-standard transactions lying
>around)
>and was aware that the creator intended to doublespend as soon as the
>transaction was discovered, wouldn't they instead prefer to not touch
>anything and wait for a non-bait target to appear?

Re-read my last section on the "scorched earth" disincentive to doublespend the intruder.