Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com
	designates 209.85.213.171 as permitted sender)
	client-ip=209.85.213.171; envelope-from=gmaxwell@gmail.com;
	helo=mail-ig0-f171.google.com; 
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CABssiCpUE=3GhC+Scd3htzVb9+gmLeZ0mEO5LY-zxywvguZ--w@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CABssiCpUE=3GhC+Scd3htzVb9+gmLeZ0mEO5LY-zxywvguZ--w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2014 05:30:32 +0000
Message-ID: <CAAS2fgRPZ5yrHYrdG8fEZQi92J-DVY_fZNFc8wnt81Pvx_mLNQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>
To: Mistr Bigs <misterbg6@gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P
 network paper
Precedence: list

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 12:45 AM, Mistr Bigs <misterbg6@gmail.com> wrote:
> That's what I was trying to say... The researchers are deanonymizing
> transactions from non-Tor connected hosts. So why are we talking about Tor
> limitations in response to this? Shouldn't we be discussing how to address
> the issues in Bitcoin proper?

Because if the user does not use tor or an analogous infrastructure
(e.g. something else reimplementing tor's functionality) the user can
be deanonymized in many different ways.

At the end of the day, if I'm listening widely to the network, and
your host is regularly the first to hand me your transactions then I
can draw reasonably reliable conclusions... and this is true even if
there is a complete absence of identifiable characteristics otherwise.

And, on the flip side if the host is persistently behind tor, even
with some watermarkable behaviour, their privacy is protected.  So
making sure that hosts can continually use tor (or similar systems)
should be the higher priority.  (And, of course, not reimplementing
tor  leverages the millions of dollars of investment and dozens of
subject matter experts working on that system).