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Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2024 18:34:19 -0700 (PDT)
From: Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Re: Proposing a P2QRH BIP towards a quantum
 resistant soft fork
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Hi Hunter Beast,

Apologies for the delay in answer.

> I was thinking of focusing on the IBM Quantum System Two, mention how it=
=20
can be scaled, and that although it might be quite limited, if running=20
Shor's variant for a > sufficient amount of time, above a certain minimum=
=20
threshold of qubits, it might be capable of decrypting the key to an=20
address within one year. I base this on the estimate > provided in a study=
=20
by the Sussex Centre for Quantum Technologies, et. al [1]. They provide two=
=20
figures, 317M qubits to decrypt in one hour, 13M qubits to decrypt in one >=
=20
day. It would seem it scales roughly linearly, and so extrapolating it=20
further, 36,000 qubits would be needed to decrypt an address within one=20
year. However, the IBM Heron > QPU turned out to have a gate time 100x less=
=20
than was estimated in 2022, and so it might be possible to make do with=20
even fewer qubits still within that timeframe. With > only 360 qubits,=20
barring algorithmic overhead such as for circuit memory, it might be=20
possible to decrypt a single address within a year. That might sound like a=
=20
lot, but > being able to accomplish that at all would be significant,=20
almost like a Chicago Pile moment, proving something in practice that was=
=20
previously only thought theoretically > possible for the past 3 decades.=20
And it's only downhill from there...

Briefly surveying the paper "The impact of hardware specifications on=20
reaching quantum advantage in the fault tolerant regime", I think it's a=20
reasonble framework to evaluate
the practical efficiency of quantum attacks on bitcoin, it's self=20
consistent and there is a critical approach referencing the usual=20
litterature on quantum attacks on bitcoin. Just
note the caveat, one can find in usual quantum complexity litterature,=20
"particularly in regard to end-to-end physical resource estimation. There=
=20
are many other error correction
techniques available, and the best choice will likely depend on the=20
underlying architecture's characteristics, such as the available physical=
=20
qubit=E2=80=93qubit connectivity" (verbatim). Namely, evaluating quantum at=
tacks is=20
very dependent on the concrete physical architecture underpinning it.

All that said, I agree with you that if you see a quantum computer with the=
=20
range of 1000 physical qubits being able to break the DLP for ECC based=20
encryption like secp256k1, even if it takes a year it will be a Chicago=20
Pile moment, or whatever comparative experiments which were happening about=
=20
chain of nuclear reactions in 30s / 40s.

>  I think it's time to revisit these discussions given IBM's progress.=20
They've published a two videos in particular that are worth watching; their=
=20
keynote from December of last > year [2], and their roadmap update from=20
just last month [3]

I have looked on the roadmap as it's available on the IBM blog post:=20
https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/quantum-roadmap-2033#mark-roadmap-out-to-2=
033
They give only a target of 2000 logical qubit to be reach in 2033...which=
=20
is surprisingly not that strong...And one expect they might hit likely soli=
d
state issues in laying out in hardware the Heron processor architecture. As=
=20
a point of thinking, it took like 2 decades to advance on the state of art
of litography in traditional chips manufacturing.
=20
So I think it's good to stay cool minded and I think my observation about=
=20
talking of "super-exponential rate" as used in maaku old blog post does not
hold a lot of rigor to describe the advances in the field of quantum=20
computing. Note, also how IMB is a commercial entity that can have a lot of=
=20
interests
in "pumping" the state of "quantum computing" to gather fundings (there is=
=20
a historical anecdote among bitcoin OG circles about Vitalik trying to do a=
n
ICO to build a quantum computer like 10 years ago, just to remember).

> I'm supportive of this consideration. FALCON might be a good substitute,=
=20
and maybe it can be upgraded to HAWK for even better performance depending=
=20
on how much > time there is. According to the BIP, FALCON signatures are=20
~10x larger t> han Schnorr signatures, so this will of course make the=20
transaction more expensive, but we also > must remember, these signatures=
=20
will be going into the witness, which already receives a 4x discount.=20
Perhaps the discount could be incr> eased further someday to fit > more=20
transactions into blocks, but this will also likely result in more=20
inscriptions filling unused space also, which permanently increases the=20
burden of running an archive > node. Due to the controversy s> uch a change=
=20
could bring, I would rather any increases in the witness discount be=20
excluded from future activation discussions, so as to be > considered=20
separately, even if it pertains to an increase in P2QRH transaction size.
=20
> Do you think it's worth reworking the BIP to use FALCON signatures? I've=
=20
only done a deep dive into SQIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will acknowledge the=
=20
readiness levels between those two are presently worlds apart.

I think FALCON is what has the smallest pubkey + sig size for hash-and-sign=
=20
lattice-based schemes. So I think it's worth reworking the BIP to see what=
=20
has the smallest generation / validation time and pubkey + size space for=
=20
the main post-quantum scheme. At least for dilthium, falcon, sphincs+ and=
=20
SQISign. For an hypothetical witness discount, a v2 P2QRH could be always=
=20
be moved in a very template annex tag / field.

> Also, do you think it's of any concern to use HASH160 instead of HASH256=
=20
in the output script? I think it's fine for a cryptographic commitment=20
since it's simply a hash of a hash (MD160 of SHA-256).

See literature on quantum attacks on bitcoin in the reference of the paper=
=20
you quote ("The impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantum=20
advantage in the fault tolerant regime") for a discussion on Grover's=20
search algorithm.

> I'm not sure I fully understand this, but even more practically, as=20
mentioned in the BIP, value can simply be kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally=
=20
with a value of fewer than 50
> coins per address, and when funds ever need to be spent, the>=20
 transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a trusted mining pool,=
=20
ideally one that does KYC, so it's
> known which individual miners get to see the public key before it's=20
mined. It's not perfect, since this relies on exogenou> s security=20
assumptions, which is why P2QRH is
> proposed.

Again, the paper you're referencing ("The impact of hardware specifications=
=20
on reaching quantum advantage...") is analyzing the performance of quantum=
=20
advantage under
2 dimensions, namely space and time. My observation is in Bitcoin we have=
=20
an additional dimension, "coin scarcity" that can be leveraged to build=20
defense of address
spends in face of quantum attacks.

Namely you can introduce an artifical "witness-stack size scale ladder" in=
=20
pseudo-bitcoin script: OP_SIZE <1000> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_DROP ...checksig...
I have not verified it works well on bitcoin core though this script should=
=20
put the burden on the quantum attacker to have enough bitcoin amount=20
available to burn in on-chain fees in witness size to break a P2WPKH.

>  ideally with a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and when funds=
=20
ever need to be spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out of band=
=20
to a trusted mining pool, ideally
> one that does KYC, so it's known which individual > miners get to see the=
=20
public key before it's mined. It's not perfect, since this relies on=20
exogenous security assumptions, which is
> why P2QRH is proposed.

The technical issue if you implement KYC for a mining pool you're=20
increasing your DoS surface and this could be exploited by competing=20
miners. A more reasonable security model can be to have miner coinbase=20
pubkeys being used to commit to the "seen-in-mempool" spends and from then=
=20
build "hand wawy" fraud proofs that a miner is quantum attacking you're=20
P2WSH spends at pubkey reveal time during transaction relay.

Best,
Antoine

ots hash: 1ad818955bbf0c5468847c00c2974ddb5cf609d630523622bfdb27f1f0dc0b30
Le lundi 17 juin 2024 =C3=A0 23:25:25 UTC+1, hunter a =C3=A9crit :

>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
>
> On 2024-06-16 19:31, Antoine Riard <antoin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi Hunter Beast,I think any post-quantum upgrade signature algorithm=20
> upgrade proposal would grandly benefit to haveShor's based practical=20
> attacks far more defined in the Bitcoin context. As soon you start to tal=
k=20
> aboutquantum computers there is no such thing as a "quantum computer"=20
> though a wide array of architecturesbased on a range of technologies to=
=20
> encode qubits on nanoscale physical properties.
> >
> Good point. I can write a section in the BIP Motivation or Security=20
> section about how an attack might take place practically, and the potenti=
al=20
> urgency of such an attack.
> =20
> I was thinking of focusing on the IBM Quantum System Two, mention how it=
=20
> can be scaled, and that although it might be quite limited, if running=20
> Shor's variant for a sufficient amount of time, above a certain minimum=
=20
> threshold of qubits, it might be capable of decrypting the key to an=20
> address within one year. I base this on the estimate provided in a study =
by=20
> the Sussex Centre for Quantum Technologies, et. al [1]. They provide two=
=20
> figures, 317M qubits to decrypt in one hour, 13M qubits to decrypt in one=
=20
> day. It would seem it scales roughly linearly, and so extrapolating it=20
> further, 36,000 qubits would be needed to decrypt an address within one=
=20
> year. However, the IBM Heron QPU turned out to have a gate time 100x less=
=20
> than was estimated in 2022, and so it might be possible to make do with=
=20
> even fewer qubits still within that timeframe. With only 360 qubits,=20
> barring algorithmic overhead such as for circuit memory, it might be=20
> possible to decrypt a single address within a year. That might sound like=
 a=20
> lot, but being able to accomplish that at all would be significant, almos=
t=20
> like a Chicago Pile moment, proving something in practice that was=20
> previously only thought theoretically possible for the past 3 decades. An=
d=20
> it's only downhill from there...
> >
> > This is not certain that any Shor's algorithm variant works smoothly=20
> independently of the quantum computerarchitecture considered (e.g gate=20
> frequency, gate infidelity, cooling energy consumption) and I think it'sa=
n=20
> interesting open game-theory problem if you can concentrate a sufficiant=
=20
> amount of energy before anycoin owner moves them in consequence (e.g seei=
ng=20
> a quantum break in the mempool and reacting with a counter-spend).
> >
> It should be noted that P2PK keys still hold millions of bitcoin, and=20
> those encode the entire public key for everyone to see for all time. Thus=
,=20
> early QC attacks won't need to consider the complexities of the mempool.
> >
> > In my opinion, one of the last time the subject was addressed on the=20
> mailing list, the description of the state of the quantum computer field=
=20
> was not realistic and get into risk characterization hyperbole talking=20
> about "super-exponential rate" (when indeed there is no empirical=20
> realization that distinct theoretical advance on quantum capabilities can=
=20
> be combined with each other) [1].
> >
> I think it's time to revisit these discussions given IBM's progress.=20
> They've published a two videos in particular that are worth watching; the=
ir=20
> keynote from December of last year [2], and their roadmap update from jus=
t=20
> last month [3].
> >
> > On your proposal, there is an immediate observation which comes to mind=
,=20
> namely why not using one of the algorithm(dilthium, sphincs+, falcon) whi=
ch=20
> has been through the 3 rounds of NIST cryptanalysis. Apart of the signatu=
re=20
> size,which sounds to be smaller, in a network of full-nodes any PQ=20
> signature algorithm should have reasonable verificationperformances.
> >
> I'm supportive of this consideration. FALCON might be a good substitute,=
=20
> and maybe it can be upgraded to HAWK for even better performance dependin=
g=20
> on how much time there is. According to the BIP, FALCON signatures are ~1=
0x=20
> larger than Schnorr signatures, so this will of course make the transacti=
on=20
> more expensive, but we also must remember, these signatures will be going=
=20
> into the witness, which already receives a 4x discount. Perhaps the=20
> discount could be increased further someday to fit more transactions into=
=20
> blocks, but this will also likely result in more inscriptions filling=20
> unused space also, which permanently increases the burden of running an=
=20
> archive node. Due to the controversy such a change could bring, I would=
=20
> rather any increases in the witness discount be excluded from future=20
> activation discussions, so as to be considered separately, even if it=20
> pertains to an increase in P2QRH transaction size.
> =20
> Do you think it's worth reworking the BIP to use FALCON signatures? I've=
=20
> only done a deep dive into SQIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will acknowledge t=
he=20
> readiness levels between those two are presently worlds apart.
> =20
> Also, do you think it's of any concern to use HASH160 instead of HASH256=
=20
> in the output script? I think it's fine for a cryptographic commitment=20
> since it's simply a hash of a hash (MD160 of SHA-256).
> >
> > Lastly, there is a practical defensive technique that can be implemente=
d=20
> today by coin owners to protect in face ofhyptothetical quantum=20
> adversaries. Namely setting spending scripts to request an artificially=
=20
> inflated witness stack,as the cost has to be burden by the spender. I thi=
nk=20
> one can easily do that with OP_DUP and OP_GREATERTHAN and a bitof stack=
=20
> shuffling. While the efficiency of this technique is limited by the max=
=20
> consensus size of the script stack(`MAX_STACK_SIZE`) and the max consensu=
s=20
> size of stack element (`MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE`), this adds an=20
> additional"scarce coins" pre-requirement on the quantum adversarise to=20
> succeed. Shor's algorithm is only defined under theclassic ressources of=
=20
> computational complexity, time and space.
> >
> I'm not sure I fully understand this, but even more practically, as=20
> mentioned in the BIP, value can simply be kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally=
=20
> with a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and when funds ever need=
=20
> to be spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a=20
> trusted mining pool, ideally one that does KYC, so it's known which=20
> individual miners get to see the public key before it's mined. It's not=
=20
> perfect, since this relies on exogenous security assumptions, which is wh=
y=20
> P2QRH is proposed.
> >
> > Best,Antoine
> > [1] https://freicoin.substack.com/p/why-im-against-taproot
> >
> =20
> I'm grateful you took the time to review the BIP and offer your detailed=
=20
> insights.
> =20
> [1] =E2=80=9CThe impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantum ad=
vantage=20
> in the fault tolerant regime,=E2=80=9D 2022 -=20
> https://pubs.aip.org/avs/aqs/article/4/1/013801/2835275/The-impact-of-har=
dware-specifications-on-reaching
> [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DDe2IlWji8Ck
> [3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dd5aIx79OTps
> =20
> >
> >
> > Le vendredi 14 juin 2024 =C3=A0 15:30:54 UTC+1, Hunter Beast a =C3=A9cr=
it :
> >
> > > Good points. I like your suggestion for a SPHINCS+, just due to how=
=20
> mature it is in comparison to SQIsign. It's already in its third round an=
d=20
> has several standards-compliant implementations, and it has an actual=20
> specification rather than just a research paper. One thing to consider is=
=20
> that NIST-I round 3 signatures are 982 bytes in size, according to what I=
=20
> was able to find in the documents hosted by the SPHINCS website.
> > >=20
> https://web.archive.org/web/20230711000109if_/http://sphincs.org/data/sph=
incs+-round3-submission-nist.zip
> > > =20
> > > One way to handle this is to introduce this as a separate address typ=
e=20
> than SQIsign. That won't require OP_CAT, and I do want to keep this soft=
=20
> fork limited in scope. If SQIsign does become significantly broken, in th=
is=20
> hopefully far future scenario, I might be supportive of an increase in th=
e=20
> witness discount.
> > > =20
> > > Also, I've made some additional changes based on your feedback on X.=
=20
> You can review them here if you so wish:
> > >=20
> https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/5/files?short_path=3D917a32a#dif=
f-917a32a71b69bf62d7c85dfb13d520a0340a30a2889b015b82d36411ed45e754
> > >
> > >
> > > On Friday, June 14, 2024 at 8:15:29=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Pierre-Luc=20
> Dallaire-Demers wrote:
> > > > SQIsign is blockchain friendly but also very new, I would recommend=
=20
> adding a hash-based backup key in case an attack on SQIsign is found in t=
he=20
> future (recall that SIDH broke over the span of a weekend=20
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdf).
> > > > Backup keys can be added in the form of a Merkle tree where one=20
> branch would contain the SQIsign public key and the other the public key =
of=20
> the recovery hash-based scheme. For most transactions it would only add o=
ne=20
> bit to specify the SQIsign branch.
> > > > The hash-based method could be Sphincs+, which is standardized by=
=20
> NIST but requires adding extra code, or Lamport, which is not standardize=
d=20
> but can be verified on-chain with OP-CAT.
> > > >
> > > > On Sunday, June 9, 2024 at 12:07:16=E2=80=AFp.m. UTC-4 Hunter Beast=
 wrote:
> > > > > The motivation for this BIP is to provide a concrete proposal for=
=20
> adding quantum resistance to Bitcoin. We will need to pick a signature=20
> algorithm, implement it, and have it ready in event of quantum emergency.=
=20
> There will be time to adopt it. Importantly, this first step is a more=20
> substantive answer to those with concerns beyond, "quantum computers may=
=20
> pose a threat, but we likely don't have to worry about that for a long=20
> time". Bitcoin development and activation is slow, so it's important that=
=20
> those with low time preference start discussing this as a serious=20
> possibility sooner rather than later. This is meant to be the first in a=
=20
> series of BIPs regarding a hypothetical "QuBit" soft fork. The BIP is=20
> intended to propose concrete solutions, even if they're early and=20
> incomplete, so that Bitcoin developers are aware of the existence of thes=
e=20
> solutions and their potential. This is just a rough draft and not the=20
> finished BIP. I'd like to validate the approach and hear if I should=20
> continue working on it, whether serious changes are needed, or if this=20
> truly isn't a worthwhile endeavor right now.
> > > > > =20
> > > > > The BIP can be found here:
> > > > > https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawik=
i
> > > > > =20
> > > > > Thank you for your time.
> > > > > =20
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in=
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Hi Hunter Beast,<br /><br />Apologies for the delay in answer.<br /><br />&=
gt; I was thinking of focusing on the IBM Quantum System Two, mention how i=
t can be scaled, and that although it might be quite limited, if running Sh=
or's variant for a &gt; sufficient amount of time, above a certain minimum =
threshold of qubits, it might be capable of decrypting the key to an addres=
s within one year. I base this on the estimate &gt; provided in a study by =
the Sussex Centre for Quantum Technologies, et. al [1]. They provide two fi=
gures, 317M qubits to decrypt in one hour, 13M qubits to decrypt in one &gt=
; day. It would seem it scales roughly linearly, and so extrapolating it fu=
rther, 36,000 qubits would be needed to decrypt an address within one year.=
 However, the IBM Heron &gt; QPU turned out to have a gate time 100x less t=
han was estimated in 2022, and so it might be possible to make do with even=
 fewer qubits still within that timeframe. With &gt; only 360 qubits, barri=
ng algorithmic overhead such as for circuit memory, it might be possible to=
 decrypt a single address within a year. That might sound like a lot, but &=
gt; being able to accomplish that at all would be significant, almost like =
a Chicago Pile moment, proving something in practice that was previously on=
ly thought theoretically &gt; possible for the past 3 decades. And it's onl=
y downhill from there...<br /><br />Briefly surveying the paper "The impact=
 of hardware specifications on reaching quantum advantage in the fault tole=
rant regime", I think it's a reasonble framework to evaluate<br />the pract=
ical efficiency of quantum attacks on bitcoin, it's self consistent and the=
re is a critical approach referencing the usual litterature on quantum atta=
cks on bitcoin. Just<br />note the caveat, one can find in usual quantum co=
mplexity litterature, "particularly in regard to end-to-end physical resour=
ce estimation. There are many other error correction<br />techniques availa=
ble, and the best choice will likely depend on the underlying architecture'=
s characteristics, such as the available physical qubit=E2=80=93qubit conne=
ctivity" (verbatim). Namely, evaluating quantum attacks is very dependent o=
n the concrete physical architecture underpinning it.<br /><br />All that s=
aid, I agree with you that if you see a quantum computer with the range of =
1000 physical qubits being able to break the DLP for ECC based encryption l=
ike secp256k1, even if it takes a year it will be a Chicago Pile moment, or=
 whatever comparative experiments which were happening about chain of nucle=
ar reactions in 30s / 40s.<br /><br />&gt; =C2=A0I think it's time to revis=
it these discussions given IBM's progress. They've published a two videos i=
n particular that are worth watching; their keynote from December of last &=
gt; year [2], and their roadmap update from just last month [3]<br /><br />=
I have looked on the roadmap as it's available on the IBM blog post: https:=
//www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/quantum-roadmap-2033#mark-roadmap-out-to-2033<br=
 />They give only a target of 2000 logical qubit to be reach in 2033...whic=
h is surprisingly not that strong...And one expect they might hit likely so=
lid<br />state issues in laying out in hardware the Heron processor archite=
cture. As a point of thinking, it took like 2 decades to advance on the sta=
te of art<br />of litography in traditional chips manufacturing.<br />=C2=
=A0<br />So I think it's good to stay cool minded and I think my observatio=
n about talking of "super-exponential rate" as used in maaku old blog post =
does not<br />hold a lot of rigor to describe the advances in the field of =
quantum computing. Note, also how IMB is a commercial entity that can have =
a lot of interests<br />in "pumping" the state of "quantum computing" to ga=
ther fundings (there is a historical anecdote among bitcoin OG circles abou=
t Vitalik trying to do an<br />ICO to build a quantum computer like 10 year=
s ago, just to remember).<br /><br />&gt; I'm supportive of this considerat=
ion. FALCON might be a good substitute, and maybe it can be upgraded to HAW=
K for even better performance depending on how much &gt; time there is. Acc=
ording to the BIP, FALCON signatures are ~10x larger t&gt; han Schnorr sign=
atures, so this will of course make the transaction more expensive, but we =
also &gt; must remember, these signatures will be going into the witness, w=
hich already receives a 4x discount. Perhaps the discount could be incr&gt;=
 eased further someday to fit &gt; more transactions into blocks, but this =
will also likely result in more inscriptions filling unused space also, whi=
ch permanently increases the burden of running an archive &gt; node. Due to=
 the controversy s&gt; uch a change could bring, I would rather any increas=
es in the witness discount be excluded from future activation discussions, =
so as to be &gt; considered separately, even if it pertains to an increase =
in P2QRH transaction size.<br />=C2=A0<br />&gt; Do you think it's worth re=
working the BIP to use FALCON signatures? I've only done a deep dive into S=
QIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will acknowledge the readiness levels between th=
ose two are presently worlds apart.<br /><br />I think FALCON is what has t=
he smallest pubkey + sig size for hash-and-sign lattice-based schemes. So I=
 think it's worth reworking the BIP to see what has the smallest generation=
 / validation time and pubkey + size space for the main post-quantum scheme=
. At least for dilthium, falcon, sphincs+ and SQISign. For an hypothetical =
witness discount, a v2 P2QRH could be always be moved in a very template an=
nex tag / field.<br /><br />&gt; Also, do you think it's of any concern to =
use HASH160 instead of HASH256 in the output script? I think it's fine for =
a cryptographic commitment since it's simply a hash of a hash (MD160 of SHA=
-256).<br /><br />See literature on quantum attacks on bitcoin in the refer=
ence of the paper you quote ("The impact of hardware specifications on reac=
hing quantum advantage in the fault tolerant regime") for a discussion on G=
rover's search algorithm.<br /><br />&gt; I'm not sure I fully understand t=
his, but even more practically, as mentioned in the BIP, value can simply b=
e kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally with a value of fewer than 50<div>&gt; co=
ins per address, and when funds ever need to be spent, the&gt; =C2=A0transa=
ction is signed and submitted out of band to a trusted mining pool, ideally=
 one that does KYC, so it's</div><div>&gt; known which individual miners ge=
t to see the public key before it's mined. It's not perfect, since this rel=
ies on exogenou&gt; s security assumptions, which is why P2QRH is</div><div=
>&gt; proposed.<br /><br />Again, the paper you're referencing ("The impact=
 of hardware specifications on reaching quantum advantage...") is analyzing=
 the performance of quantum advantage under<br />2 dimensions, namely space=
 and time. My observation is in Bitcoin we have an additional dimension, "c=
oin scarcity" that can be leveraged to build defense of address<br />spends=
 in face of quantum attacks.<br /><br />Namely you can introduce an artific=
al "witness-stack size scale ladder" in pseudo-bitcoin script: OP_SIZE &lt;=
1000&gt; OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_DROP ...checksig...<br />I have not verified it =
works well on bitcoin core though this script should put the burden on the =
quantum attacker to have enough bitcoin amount available to burn in on-chai=
n fees in witness size to break a P2WPKH.<br /><br />&gt; =C2=A0ideally wit=
h a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and when funds ever need to b=
e spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a trusted m=
ining pool, ideally<br />&gt; one that does KYC, so it's known which indivi=
dual &gt; miners get to see the public key before it's mined. It's not perf=
ect, since this relies on exogenous security assumptions, which is<br />&gt=
; why P2QRH is proposed.<br /><br />The technical issue if you implement KY=
C for a mining pool you're increasing your DoS surface and this could be ex=
ploited by competing miners. A more reasonable security model can be to hav=
e miner coinbase pubkeys being used to commit to the "seen-in-mempool" spen=
ds and from then build "hand wawy" fraud proofs that a miner is quantum att=
acking you're P2WSH spends at pubkey reveal time during transaction relay.<=
br /><br />Best,<br />Antoine</div><div><br /></div><div>ots hash:=C2=A01ad=
818955bbf0c5468847c00c2974ddb5cf609d630523622bfdb27f1f0dc0b30</div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"gmail_attr">Le lundi 17 juin =
2024 =C3=A0 23:25:25 UTC+1, hunter a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:<br/></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0 0 0 0.8ex; border-left: 1px soli=
d rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">
<br>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
<br>Hash: SHA256
<br>
<br>On 2024-06-16 19:31, Antoine Riard &lt;<a href data-email-masked rel=3D=
"nofollow">antoin...@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:
<br>
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; Hi Hunter Beast,I think any post-quantum upgrade signature algorit=
hm upgrade proposal would grandly benefit to haveShor&#39;s based practical=
 attacks far more defined in the Bitcoin context. As soon you start to talk=
 aboutquantum computers there is no such thing as a &quot;quantum computer&=
quot; though a wide array of architecturesbased on a range of technologies =
to encode qubits on nanoscale physical properties.
<br>&gt;
<br>Good point. I can write a section in the BIP Motivation or Security sec=
tion about how an attack might take place practically, and the potential ur=
gency of such an attack.
<br>=C2=A0
<br>I was thinking of focusing on the IBM Quantum System Two, mention how i=
t can be scaled, and that although it might be quite limited, if running Sh=
or&#39;s variant for a sufficient amount of time, above a certain minimum t=
hreshold of qubits, it might be capable of decrypting the key to an address=
 within one year. I base this on the estimate provided in a study by the Su=
ssex Centre for Quantum Technologies, et. al [1]. They provide two figures,=
 317M qubits to decrypt in one hour, 13M qubits to decrypt in one day. It w=
ould seem it scales roughly linearly, and so extrapolating it further, 36,0=
00 qubits would be needed to decrypt an address within one year. However, t=
he IBM Heron QPU=C2=A0turned out to have a gate time 100x less than was est=
imated in 2022, and so it might be possible to make do with even fewer qubi=
ts still within that timeframe. With only 360 qubits, barring algorithmic o=
verhead such as for circuit memory, it might be possible to=C2=A0decrypt a =
single address within a year. That might sound like a lot, but being able t=
o=C2=A0accomplish that=C2=A0at all would be significant, almost like a Chic=
ago Pile moment, proving something in practice that was previously only tho=
ught theoretically possible for the past 3 decades. And it&#39;s only downh=
ill from there...
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; This is not certain that any Shor&#39;s algorithm variant works sm=
oothly independently of the quantum computerarchitecture considered (e.g ga=
te frequency, gate infidelity, cooling energy consumption) and I think it&#=
39;san interesting open game-theory problem if you can concentrate a suffic=
iant amount of energy before anycoin owner moves them in consequence (e.g s=
eeing a quantum break in the mempool and reacting with a counter-spend).
<br>&gt;
<br>It should be noted that P2PK keys still hold millions of bitcoin, and t=
hose encode the entire public key for everyone to see for all time. Thus, e=
arly QC attacks won&#39;t need to consider the=C2=A0complexities of the mem=
pool.
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; In my opinion, one of the last time the subject was addressed on t=
he mailing list, the description of the state of the quantum computer field=
 was not realistic and get into risk characterization hyperbole talking abo=
ut &quot;super-exponential rate&quot; (when indeed there is no empirical re=
alization=C2=A0that distinct theoretical advance on quantum capabilities=C2=
=A0can be combined with each other) [1].
<br>&gt;
<br>I think it&#39;s time to revisit these discussions given IBM&#39;s prog=
ress. They&#39;ve published a two videos in particular that are worth watch=
ing; their keynote from December of last year [2], and their roadmap update=
 from just last month [3].
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; On your proposal, there is an immediate observation which comes to=
 mind, namely why not using one of the algorithm(dilthium, sphincs+, falcon=
) which has been through the 3 rounds of NIST cryptanalysis. Apart of the s=
ignature size,which sounds to be smaller, in a network of full-nodes any PQ=
 signature algorithm should have reasonable verificationperformances.
<br>&gt;
<br>I&#39;m supportive of this consideration. FALCON might be a good substi=
tute, and maybe it can be upgraded to HAWK for even better performance depe=
nding on how much time there is. According to the BIP, FALCON signatures ar=
e ~10x larger than Schnorr signatures, so this will of course make the tran=
saction more expensive, but we also must remember, these signatures will be=
 going into the witness, which already receives a 4x discount. Perhaps the =
discount could be increased further someday to fit more transactions into b=
locks, but this will also likely result in more inscriptions filling unused=
 space also, which permanently increases the burden of running an archive n=
ode. Due to the controversy such a change could bring, I would rather any i=
ncreases in the witness discount be excluded from future activation discuss=
ions, so as to be considered separately, even if it pertains to an increase=
 in P2QRH transaction size.
<br>=C2=A0
<br>Do you think it&#39;s worth reworking the BIP to use FALCON signatures?=
 I&#39;ve only done a deep dive into SQIsign and SPHINCS+, and I will ackno=
wledge the readiness levels between those two are presently worlds apart.
<br>=C2=A0
<br>Also, do you think it&#39;s of any concern to use HASH160 instead of HA=
SH256 in the output script? I think it&#39;s fine for a cryptographic commi=
tment since it&#39;s simply a hash of a hash (MD160 of SHA-256).
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; Lastly, there is a practical defensive technique that can be imple=
mented today by coin owners to protect in face ofhyptothetical quantum adve=
rsaries. Namely setting spending scripts to request an artificially inflate=
d witness stack,as the cost has to be burden by the spender. I think one ca=
n easily do that with OP_DUP and OP_GREATERTHAN and a bitof stack shuffling=
. While the efficiency of this technique is limited by the max consensus si=
ze of the script stack(`MAX_STACK_SIZE`) and the max consensus size of stac=
k element (`MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE`), this adds an additional&quot;scarce =
coins&quot; pre-requirement on the quantum adversarise to succeed. Shor&#39=
;s algorithm is only defined under theclassic ressources of computational c=
omplexity, time and space.
<br>&gt;
<br>I&#39;m not sure I fully understand this, but even more practically, as=
 mentioned in the BIP, value can simply be kept in P2WPKH outputs, ideally =
with a value of fewer than 50 coins per address, and when funds ever need t=
o be spent, the transaction is signed and submitted out of band to a truste=
d mining pool, ideally one that does KYC, so it&#39;s known which individua=
l miners get to see the public key before it&#39;s mined. It&#39;s not perf=
ect, since this relies on exogenous security assumptions, which is why P2QR=
H is proposed.
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; Best,Antoine
<br>&gt; [1]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://freicoin.substack.com/p/why-im-against=
-taproot" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nofollow" data-saferedirecturl=3D"https:=
//www.google.com/url?hl=3Dfr&amp;q=3Dhttps://freicoin.substack.com/p/why-im=
-against-taproot&amp;source=3Dgmail&amp;ust=3D1720920596076000&amp;usg=3DAO=
vVaw0XUMHJVxElIFDHr9_jVsff">https://freicoin.substack.com/p/why-im-against-=
taproot</a>
<br>&gt;
<br>=C2=A0
<br>I&#39;m grateful you took the time to review the BIP and offer your det=
ailed insights.
<br>=C2=A0
<br>[1] =E2=80=9CThe impact of hardware specifications on reaching quantum =
advantage in the fault tolerant regime,=E2=80=9D 2022=C2=A0-=C2=A0<a href=
=3D"https://pubs.aip.org/avs/aqs/article/4/1/013801/2835275/The-impact-of-h=
ardware-specifications-on-reaching" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nofollow" data=
-saferedirecturl=3D"https://www.google.com/url?hl=3Dfr&amp;q=3Dhttps://pubs=
.aip.org/avs/aqs/article/4/1/013801/2835275/The-impact-of-hardware-specific=
ations-on-reaching&amp;source=3Dgmail&amp;ust=3D1720920596076000&amp;usg=3D=
AOvVaw3bSk6mN4iGQ5aXY3KyLPEM">https://pubs.aip.org/avs/aqs/article/4/1/0138=
01/2835275/The-impact-of-hardware-specifications-on-reaching</a>
<br>[2]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DDe2IlWji8Ck" targ=
et=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nofollow" data-saferedirecturl=3D"https://www.google.c=
om/url?hl=3Dfr&amp;q=3Dhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v%3DDe2IlWji8Ck&amp;so=
urce=3Dgmail&amp;ust=3D1720920596076000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw29lG0NFzT1y3kVmbhPe=
iok">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DDe2IlWji8Ck</a>
<br>[3]=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dd5aIx79OTps" targ=
et=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nofollow" data-saferedirecturl=3D"https://www.google.c=
om/url?hl=3Dfr&amp;q=3Dhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v%3Dd5aIx79OTps&amp;so=
urce=3Dgmail&amp;ust=3D1720920596076000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw36piVFgMiooTX2aPpKd=
sAK">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dd5aIx79OTps</a>
<br>=C2=A0
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; Le vendredi 14 juin 2024 =C3=A0 15:30:54 UTC+1, Hunter Beast a =C3=
=A9crit=C2=A0:
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; &gt; Good points. I like your suggestion for a SPHINCS+, just due =
to how mature it is in comparison to SQIsign. It&#39;s already in its third=
 round and has several standards-compliant implementations, and it has an a=
ctual specification rather than just a research paper. One thing to conside=
r is that NIST-I round 3 signatures are 982 bytes in size, according to wha=
t I was able to find in the documents hosted by the SPHINCS website.
<br>&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://web.archive.org/web/20230711000109if_/http=
://sphincs.org/data/sphincs+-round3-submission-nist.zip" target=3D"_blank" =
rel=3D"nofollow" data-saferedirecturl=3D"https://www.google.com/url?hl=3Dfr=
&amp;q=3Dhttps://web.archive.org/web/20230711000109if_/http://sphincs.org/d=
ata/sphincs%2B-round3-submission-nist.zip&amp;source=3Dgmail&amp;ust=3D1720=
920596076000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw2oLnDsRMGGIuAXoQrT5duz">https://web.archive.or=
g/web/20230711000109if_/http://sphincs.org/data/sphincs+-round3-submission-=
nist.zip</a>
<br>&gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br>&gt; &gt; One way to handle this is to introduce this as a separate add=
ress type than SQIsign. That won&#39;t require OP_CAT, and I do want to kee=
p this soft fork limited in scope. If SQIsign does become significantly bro=
ken, in this hopefully far future scenario, I might be supportive of an inc=
rease in the witness discount.
<br>&gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br>&gt; &gt; Also, I&#39;ve made some additional changes based on your fee=
dback on X. You can review them here if you so wish:
<br>&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/pull/5/files?s=
hort_path=3D917a32a#diff-917a32a71b69bf62d7c85dfb13d520a0340a30a2889b015b82=
d36411ed45e754" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nofollow" data-saferedirecturl=3D"=
https://www.google.com/url?hl=3Dfr&amp;q=3Dhttps://github.com/cryptoquick/b=
ips/pull/5/files?short_path%3D917a32a%23diff-917a32a71b69bf62d7c85dfb13d520=
a0340a30a2889b015b82d36411ed45e754&amp;source=3Dgmail&amp;ust=3D17209205960=
76000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw1W9VPYP5nQ0olOTPWqQqQ6">https://github.com/cryptoquic=
k/bips/pull/5/files?short_path=3D917a32a#diff-917a32a71b69bf62d7c85dfb13d52=
0a0340a30a2889b015b82d36411ed45e754</a>
<br>&gt; &gt;
<br>&gt; &gt;
<br>&gt; &gt; On Friday, June 14, 2024 at 8:15:29=E2=80=AFAM UTC-6 Pierre-L=
uc Dallaire-Demers wrote:
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; SQIsign is blockchain friendly but also very new, I woul=
d recommend adding a hash-based backup key in case an attack on SQIsign is =
found in the future (recall that SIDH broke over the span of a weekend=C2=
=A0<a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdf" target=3D"_blank" rel=
=3D"nofollow" data-saferedirecturl=3D"https://www.google.com/url?hl=3Dfr&am=
p;q=3Dhttps://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdf&amp;source=3Dgmail&amp;ust=3D172=
0920596076000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw1QsAA1H7slSHaHNDel0aRi">https://eprint.iacr.o=
rg/2022/975.pdf</a>).
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; Backup keys can be added in the form of a Merkle tree wh=
ere one branch would contain the SQIsign public key and the other the publi=
c key of the recovery hash-based scheme. For most transactions it would onl=
y add one bit to specify the SQIsign branch.
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; The hash-based method could be Sphincs+, which is standa=
rdized by NIST but requires adding extra code, or Lamport, which is not sta=
ndardized but can be verified on-chain with OP-CAT.
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt;
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; On Sunday, June 9, 2024 at 12:07:16=E2=80=AFp.m. UTC-4 H=
unter Beast wrote:
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; The motivation for this BIP is to provide a concret=
e proposal for adding quantum resistance to Bitcoin. We will need to pick a=
 signature algorithm, implement it, and have it ready in event of quantum e=
mergency. There will be time to adopt it. Importantly, this first step is a=
 more substantive answer to those with concerns beyond, &quot;quantum compu=
ters may pose a threat, but we likely don&#39;t have to worry about that fo=
r a long time&quot;. Bitcoin development and activation is slow, so it&#39;=
s important that those with low time preference start discussing this as a =
serious possibility sooner rather than later.  This is meant to be the firs=
t in a series of BIPs regarding a hypothetical &quot;QuBit&quot; soft fork.=
 The BIP is intended to propose concrete solutions, even if they&#39;re ear=
ly and incomplete, so that Bitcoin developers are aware of the existence of=
 these solutions and their potential.  This is just a rough draft and not t=
he finished BIP. I&#39;d like to validate the approach and hear if I should=
 continue working on it, whether serious changes are needed, or if this tru=
ly isn&#39;t a worthwhile endeavor right now.
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; The BIP can be found here:
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://github.com/cryptoquick/bips/blob=
/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"nofollow" data-safered=
irecturl=3D"https://www.google.com/url?hl=3Dfr&amp;q=3Dhttps://github.com/c=
ryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki&amp;source=3Dgmail&amp;ust=
=3D1720920596076000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw00XXOmMsutEXrvY21W8C_I">https://github.=
com/cryptoquick/bips/blob/p2qrh/bip-p2qrh.mediawiki</a>
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Thank you for your time.
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; =C2=A0
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt;
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt;
<br>&gt; &gt;
<br>&gt; &gt;
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt;
<br>&gt; -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic=
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<br>
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<br>
<br></blockquote></div>

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