A Blockchain Traceable Scheme with Oversight Function

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Abstract. Many blockchain researches focus on the privacy protection. However, criminals can leverage strong privacy protection of the blockchain to do illegal crimes (such as ransomware) without being punished. These crimes have caused huge losses to society and users. Implementing identity tracing is an important step in dealing with issues arising from privacy protection. In this paper, we propose a blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function (BTSOF). The design of BTSOF builds on SkyEye (Tianjun Ma et al., Cryptology ePrint Archive 2020). In BTSOF, the regulator must obtain the consent of the committee to enable tracing. Moreover, we construct a non-interactive verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme (VMSS scheme) and leverage the VMSS scheme to design a distributed multi-key generation (DMKG) protocol for the Cramer-Shoup public key encryption scheme. The DMKG protocol is used in the design of BTSOF. We provide the security definition and security proof of the VMSS scheme and DMKG protocol.

Keywords: blockchain traceable scheme · oversight function · verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme · distributed multi-key generation protocol

1 Introduction

Nowadays, the blockchain that originated in Bitcoin [23] has attracted great attention from industry and academia. The reason of high concern is mainly the large-scale application scenarios of blockchain. That is, the blockchain is no longer limited to the decentralized cryptocurrencies (e.g. PPcoin [17], Litecoin [1]), and can also be applied to other fields, such as military, insurance, supply chain, and smart contracts.

In a nutshell, the blockchain can be seen as a distributed, decentralized, anonymous, and data-immutable database. The blockchain stores data in blocks. A block contains a block header and a block body. The block body stores data in the form of a Merkle tree. The block header contains the hash value of the

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block header of the previous block to form a chain. Moreover, the block header also stores information such as the time stamp, version number, and root of the Merkle tree. The blockchain uses consensus mechanism (such as proof of work (POW) [23], proof of stake (POS) [4, 9, 16], or practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [6]) to guarantee nodes to reach consensus on some block. In other words, the consensus mechanism ensures that the entire network reaches a consensus on a unique blockchain.

There are many researches on the blockchain privacy protection [5, 8, 22, 26]. However, criminals can leverage strong privacy protection of the blockchain to do illegal crimes (such as ransomware, money laundering) without being punished. These crimes have caused huge losses to society and users. CipherTraces third quarter 2019 cryptocurrency anti-money laundering report shows that the total amount of fraud and theft related to cryptocurrencies are $4.4 billion in aggregate for 2019.

In blockchain applications, implementing identity tracing is an important step in dealing with issues arising from privacy protection. Tianjun Ma et al. proposed SkyEye [20], a blockchain traceable scheme. SkyEye can be applied in the SkyEye-friendly blockchain applications, that is, each user in these blockchain applications has the public information generated from the private information, and the users' public information can be displayed in the blockchain data. SkyEye allows the regulator to trace the users' identities of the blockchain data. However, in SkyEye, there are no restrictions and oversight measures for the regulator, and the regulator can arbitrarily trace the blockchain data.

In this paper, we propose a blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function (BTSOF) to limit the tracing right of the regulator. Our main contributions are as follows:

1. We construct a non-interactive verifiable multi-secret sharing (VMSS) scheme based on the non-interactive verifiable secret sharing scheme proposed by Pedersen (Pedersen-VSS) [25]. We leverage the Franklin-Yung multi-secret sharing scheme [13] in the design of the VMSS scheme. In addition, we provide the security definition and security proof of the VMSS scheme.
2. We use the VMSS scheme to construct a distributed multi-key generation (DMKG) protocol for the Cramer-Shoup public key encryption scheme [7]. The construction of the DMKG protocol builds on the techniques of distributed key generation (DKG) protocol proposed by Gennaro et al [15]. We define the security of the DMKG protocol and prove the security of this protocol.
3. We propose a blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function. The design of BTSOF builds on SkyEye [20]. There is a committee in BTSOF. The regulator must obtain the consent of the committee to enable tracing. The regulator can trace one data, multiple data or data in multiple period. Moreover, the design of the BTSOF scheme leverages some cryptographic primitives, including the DMKG protocol, non-interactive zero-knowledge, and digital signature scheme.

1.1 Notation

Let p and q denote two large primes such that $q-1|p$. We use $\mathbb{Z}_p$ to denote a group of order p and $\mathbb{Z}_q$ to denote a group of order q. Unless otherwise noted, the exponential operation performs modulo p operation by default. For example, g^x denotes $g^x \ mod \ p$, where $g \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Let $||$ denote the concatenate symbol, such as $a||b$ denotes the concatenation of a and b. Let $|\cdot|$ denote the size of some set, such as $|A|$ represents the number of elements in the set A.

1.2 Paper organization

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background. Section 3 provides an overview of the blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function. Section 4 describes the VMSS scheme. Section 5 details the DMKG protocol. Section 6 describes the blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function. We discuss related work in Section 7 and summarize this paper in Section 8.

2 Background

2.1 SkyEye

SkyEye, a traceable scheme for blockchain, was introduced by Tianjun Ma et al [20]. SkyEye uses some cryptographic primitives (e.g., chameleon hash scheme [18]) in the design. SkyEye consists of a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms $(Setup, Gen_{info}, Ver_{info}, Gen_{proof}, Ver_{proof}, Trace)$, where $Setup$ generates the public parameters pp for the system, Gen_{info} and Ver_{info} create and verify the user registration information respectively, Gen_{proof} and Ver_{proof} generate and verify the user's identity proof respectively, and $Trace$ algorithm traces the users' true identities in the blockchain data. A complete formal definition about these algorithms can be found in [20].

The regulator's encryption public-private key pair (pk_{reg}, sk_{reg}), that is called the traceable public-private key pair, is generated by $Setup$ algorithm, where pk_{reg} is included in the pp and sk_{reg} is obtained by the regulator. The identity proof of each user includes the ciphertext of the user's chameleon hash public key under pk_{reg}. We use u to denote a user, id_u to denote the u's true identity and pk_{c_u} to denote the chameleon hash public key of the user u. Let CH_{id_u} denote the chameleon hash value of identity id_u and MT denote the Merkle tree. Each leaf node of MT stores the value of each successfully registered user, which is the concatenation of the chameleon hash public key and the chameleon hash value of the identity.

Figure 1 shows an overview of the blockchain application using SkyEye. The user u generates the registration information $reginfo$ and sends $reginfo$ to the regulator. If the verification of $reginfo$ is successful, the regulator can extract some information $record_u = (pk_{c_u}, id_u, CH_{id_u})$ from $reginfo$, store $record_u$ to the database, add $pk_{c_u}||CH_{id_u}$ to MT, and publish the Merkle tree MT. If



Fig. 1. An overview of the blockchain application using SkyEye.

the u's $(pk_{c_u}||CH_{id_u})$ appears in the Merkle tree MT, the user u successfully registers in the regulator. Then, the user u can generate the blockchain data $data_u$ consisting of data contents and the identity proofs of users involved in data creation. The user sends $data_u$ to the node network which includes ordinary users and verification nodes. Unlike traditional verification process in the blockchain, the verification process works as follows: (i) verifying data contents; (ii) verifying identity proofs in the data. If the verification of $data_u$ is successful, $data_u$ is added to the block that is generated by the verification node (e.g., miner). According to a consensus mechanism, the nodes in the network select a final block and add it to the blockchain. **The tracing process is shown as follows**: the regulator obtains $data_u$ from the blockchain, and gets the chameleon hash public key set PK_C by decrypting each ciphertext of chameleon hash public key in $data_u$ using the private key sk_{reg}. Finally, the regulator can obtain the users' true identity set ID in $data_u$ by searching the database according to PK_C.

2.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks

The cryptographic building blocks include the following: Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, non-interactive zero-knowledge, digital signature scheme, and multi-secret sharing scheme. Below, we informally describe these notions.

Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme. The Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme $CS = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec)$ is described below (more details are described in [7]).

• $Setup(\lambda) \rightarrow pp_{enc}$. Given a security parameter λ, this algorithm samples $g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ at random, where the order of g_1 and g_2 is q. Then, this algorithm chooses a hash function H form the family of universal one-way hash functions. Finally, $Setup$ returns the public parameters $pp_{enc} = (p, q, H, g_1, g_2)$.

• $KeyGen(pp_{enc}) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$. Given the public parameters pp_{enc}, this algorithm randomly samples $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, and computes $c_1 = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}$,

$c_2 = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}$, and $c_3 = g_1^z$. Finally, $KeyGen$ returns a pair of public/private keys $(pk, sk) = ((c_1, c_2, c_3), (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z))$.

• $Enc(pk, m) \to C$. Given the public key pk and a message m, this algorithm first randomly samples $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Then it computes

$$u_1 = g_1^r, u_2 = g_2^r, e = c_3^r m, \alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e), v = c_1^r c_2^{r\alpha}.$$

Finally, this algorithm returns $C = (u_1, u_2, e, v)$.

• $Dec(sk, C) \to m/\perp$. Given the private key sk and the ciphertext C, this algorithm computes $\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)$, and checks if

$$u_1^{x_1 + y_1\alpha} u_2^{x_2 + y_2\alpha} = v.$$

If the check fails, this algorithm outputs $\perp$; otherwise, it outputs $m = e/u_1^z$.

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge. Let $\mathcal{R} : \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \longrightarrow \{0,1\}$ be an NP relation. The language for $\mathcal{R}$ is $\mathcal{L} = \{x \in \{0,1\}^* | \exists w \in \{0,1\}^* \; s.t. \; R(x, w) = 1\}$. A non-interactive zero-knowledge scheme $NIZK = (\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ corresponds to the language $\mathcal{L}$, which is described below:

• $\mathcal{K}(\lambda) \to crs$. Given a security parameter λ, $\mathcal{K}$ returns a common reference string crs.

• $\mathcal{P}(crs, x, w) \to \pi$. Given the common reference string crs, a statement x, and a witness w, $\mathcal{P}$ returns a proof π.

• $\mathcal{V}(crs, x, \pi) \to \{0,1\}$. Given the common reference string crs, the statement x, and the proof π, $\mathcal{V}$ returns 1 if verification succeeds, or 0 if verification fails.

A non-interactive zero-knowledge scheme satisfies three secure properties: (i) *completeness*; (ii) *soundness*; and (iii) *perfectly zero knowledge*. More details are available in [2].

Digital Signature Scheme. A digital signature scheme $Sig = (KeyGen, Sign, Ver)$ is described below:

• $KeyGen(\lambda) \to (pk_{sig}, sk_{sig})$. Given a security parameter λ, $KeyGen$ returns a pair of public/private keys (pk_{sig}, sk_{sig}).

• $Sign(sk_{sig}, m) \to \sigma$. Given the private key sk_{sig} and a message m, $Sign$ returns the signature σ of the message m.

• $Ver(pk_{sig}, m, \sigma) \to b$. Given the public key pk_{sig}, the message m, and the signature σ, Ver returns $b = 1$ if the signature σ is valid; otherwise, it outputs $b = 0$.

Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme. We use the Franklin-Yung multi-secret sharing scheme [13]. A $(t - l + 1, t + 1; l, n)$-multi-secret sharing scheme has two phases: distribution phase and recovery phase, where l denotes the number of secrets, t denotes the threshold, and n denotes the number of participants.

Distribution phase. The dealer D distributes a secret set $S = \{s_1, ..., s_l\} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^l$ to n participants, $P_1, ..., P_n$. D first chooses a random polynomial f of degree t such that $f(-k) = s_k$ for $k = 1, ..., l$ and $f(-k)$ is random for $k = l + 1, ..., t + 1$. and then sends $st_i = f(i)$ secretly to P_i for $i = 1, ..., n$.

Recovery phase. Any at least $t + 1$ participants can compute the polynomial f via the Lagrange interpolation formula, and then reconstruct the secret set S.

The above scheme satisfies two properties: (1) any at least $t+1$ participants can reconstruct the secret set S; (2). Any at most $t-l+1$ participants can not find anything about the secret set S from their shares in an information-theoretic sense.

3 An Overview of the Blockchain Traceable Scheme with Oversight Function



Fig. 2. An Overview of the Blockchain Traceable Scheme with Oversight Function.

We design oversight measures for the regulator on the basis of SkyEye, so as to construct the blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function. The main design idea is shown in the Figure 2. If the regulator wants to trace the blockchain data $data_u$, it must send the data $data_u$ and corresponding evidence wit_u to the committee. And if the committee agrees this tracing, it sends the information for tracing to the regulator. Finally, the regulator can trace the data $data_u$ according to the information sent by the committee. The specific ideas are described as follows.

From Section 2.1, it can be seen that in SkyEye, the prerequisite for tracing by the regulator is to use the traceable private key sk_{reg} to decrypt all the chameleon hash public key ciphertexts in the blockchain data $data_u$ to obtain the chameleon hash public key set PK_C. For the encryption scheme in SkyEye, we use the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, and let the committee periodically generates the traceable public-private key pair of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. In other words, the regulator must obtain the consent of the committee to enable tracing. We design a DMKG protocol suitable for the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme based on the DKG protocol [15] (more details are described in Section 5). Without loss of generality, in this paper, we analyze the interaction between the committee and regulator in one period. Let T denote one period and (pk_{reg}, sk_{reg}) denote the traceable public-private key pair that is generated by the committee using the DMKG protocol in this period.

For ease of describing the next design ideas, we assume that the committee has n participants $P_1, ..., P_n$ where each member P_i is honest for $i \in \{1, ...n\}$ (and in Section 6, we analyze the case of corrupted participants in the committee). Assuming that each committee member P_i has the encryption private key component $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$ and the encryption public key component $(c_{1i}, c_{2i}, c_{3i}) = (g_1^{x_{1i}} g_2^{x_{2i}}, g_1^{y_{1i}} g_2^{y_{2i}}, g_1^{z_i})$, then the private key sk_{reg} is equal to $(x_1 = \sum_{i\in\{1,...n\}} x_{1i}\ mod\ q, x_2 = \sum_{i\in\{1,...n\}} x_{2i}\ mod\ q, y_1 = \sum_{i\in\{1,...n\}} y_{1i}\ mod\ q, y_2 = \sum_{i\in\{1,...n\}} y_{2i}\ mod\ q, z = \sum_{i\in\{1,...n\}} z_i\ mod\ q)$. and the public key pk is equal to $(c_1 = \prod_{i\in\{1,...n\}} c_{1i} = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, c_2 = \prod_{i\in\{1,...n\}} c_{2i} = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, c_3 = \prod_{i\in\{1,...n\}} c_{3i} = g_1^{z})$.

Although the traceable public-private key pair (pk_{reg}, sk_{reg}) has been generated by the committee, an issue remains. When the regulator sends the data set and corresponding evidence to the committee and the committee agrees this tracing, if the committee sends the private key sk_{reg} directly to the regulator, this will cause the regulator to trace not only the data set that it sends, but also the data of other participants using pk_{reg} during the T period.

To address the above issue, we ask the committee to send the private key sk_{reg} to the regulator only when the regulator needs to trace all data of the T period. In other cases, the committee sends some information to the regulator, which allows the regulator to trace only the data set sent to the committee. Next, we describe the design idea for the other cases. We assume that $data_u$ only has a chameleon hash public key ciphertext $C_u = (u_1, u_2, e, v) = (g_1^r, g_2^r, c_3^r pk_{c_u}, c_1^r c_2^{r\alpha})$, where r is a random number used for encryption and $\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)$. When the regulator sends $(data_u, wit_u)$ to the committee, if the committee agrees this tracing, for each $i \in \{1, ...n\}$, P_i processes the ciphertext C_u as follows .

$$u_{i1} = u_1^{(x_{1i}+y_{1i}\alpha)} = g_1^{r(x_{1i}+y_{1i}\alpha)},$$
$$u_{i2} = u_2^{(x_{2i}+y_{2i}\alpha)} = g_2^{r(x_{2i}+y_{2i}\alpha)}, u_{i3} = u_1^{z_i} = g_1^{rz_i}.$$

P_i broadcasts the (u_{i1}, u_{i2}, u_{i3}) to other members. Finally, for each $i \in \{1, ...n\}$, P_i can compute

$$\begin{aligned} u_{i12} &= \Pi_{j\in\{1,...n\}} u_{j1} u_{j2} = \Pi_{j\in\{1,...n\}} g_1^{r(x_{1j}+y_{1j}\alpha)} g_2^{r(x_{2j}+y_{2j}\alpha)} \\ &= g_1^{r(\Sigma_{j\in\{1,...n\}} x_{1j}+\alpha\Sigma_{j\in\{1,...n\}} y_{1j})} g_2^{r(\Sigma_{j\in\{1,...n\}} x_{2j}+\alpha\Sigma_{j\in\{1,...n\}} y_{2j})} \\ &= g_1^{r(x_1+y_1\alpha)} g_2^{r(x_2+y_2\alpha)} = u_1^{x_1+y_1\alpha} u_2^{x_2+y_2\alpha}; \\ u_{i13} &= \Pi_{j\in\{1,...n\}} u_{j3} = g_1^{r\Sigma_{j\in\{1,...n\}} z_j} = g_1^{rz} = u_1^{z}. \end{aligned}$$

Then, P_i sends (u_{i12}, u_{i13}) to regulator for each $i \in \{1, ...n\}$.

Because all committee members are honest, the regulator can choose the (u_{i12}, u_{i13}) for some $i \in \{1, ...n\}$ to decrypt C_u. The regulator first checks if $u_{i12} = v$. If the check passes, the regulator computes $pk_{c_u} = e/u_{i13}$, and then searches his database to determine the true identity id_u corresponding to the chameleon hash pubic key pk_{c_u}.

4 Non-Interactive Verifiable Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme

In this section, we describe the definitions, construction, and security of the VMSS scheme.

4.1 Definitions

A VMSS scheme consists of the distribution phase, verification phase, and recovery phase. In the distribution phase, the dealer distributes the secret set and sends shares to the participants. In verification phase, the participants verify the shares sent by the dealer. In recovery phase, the participants reconstruct the secret set.

We assume that a dealer D distributes a secret set $S = \{s_1, ..., s_l\} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^l$ to n participants, $P_1, ..., P_n$. Let Ver_{pro} denote the verification protocol that runs on the dealer D and participants $P_1, ..., P_n$. A VMSS scheme is secure with threshold t if it satisfies the following two definitions (cf. [25]).

Definition 1 *The Ver_{pro} must satisfy the following two requirements:*

1. *If the dealer and P_i follow Ver_{pro} for $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$, and the dealer follows the distribution agreement, P_i accepts the dealer's share with a probability of 1.*
2. *For all subsets U_1, U_2 of the set $U = \{1, ..., n\}$ $(|U_1| = |U_2| = t + 1)$, if all participants in U_1 and U_2 have accepted their respective share sent by the dealer in Ver_{pro}, the secret set S_i that is reconstructed by U_i $(i \in \{0, 1\})$ satisfies $S_1 = S_2$.*

Definition 2 *For any $A \subseteq \{1, ..., n\}$ $(|A| <= t - l + 1)$ and any $View_A$, the VMSS protocol has:*

$$P[D \text{ has a secret set } S \mid View_A] = P[D \text{ has a secret set } S],$$

where $S = \{s_1, ...s_l\}$ and $View_A$ denotes the view of the set A.

4.2 Construction

We assume that the dealer D has a secret set $S = \{s_1, ..., s_l\} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^l$, and a trusted authority has chosen $g, h \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, where $h = g^\gamma, \gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. The VMSS scheme is described as following.

Distribution phase. The dealer D samples $\beta_1, ..., \beta_l \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random, and broadcasts $E_i = g^{s_i} h^{\beta_i}$ for $i = 1, ..., l$.

Then, P_i randomly chooses two polynomials $f(x), f'(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$ of degree t such that $f(-k) = s_k$ and $f'(-k) = \beta_k$ for $k = 1, ..., l$. Let $f(x) = a_0 + a_1x + ... + a_tx^t$ and $f'(x) = b_0 + b_1x + ... + b_tx^t$. Then, D broadcasts $cm_j = g^{a_j} h^{b_j}$ for $j = 0, 1, ..., t$. Finally, D computes $st_i = f(i), sh_i = f'(i)$ and sends (st_i, sh_i) secretly to P_i for $i = 1, ..., n$.

Verification phase. For each $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$, P_i first verifies E_k for $k = 1, ...l$ and checks if

$$E_k = g^{s_i} h^{\beta_i} = \prod_{j=0}^{t} cm_j^{(-k)^j}. \tag{1}$$

If the check fails for an index k, P_i declines (st_i, sh_i); otherwise, P_i verifies (st_i, sh_i) and checks if

$$g^{st_i} h^{sh_i} = \prod_{j=0}^{t} cm_j^{i^j}. \tag{2}$$

If the check fails, P_i declines (st_i, sh_i); otherwise, P_i accepts (st_i, sh_i).

Recovery phase. Any at least $t + 1$ participants that have accepted their shares can compute the polynomial f via the Lagrange interpolation formula, and then reconstruct the secret set S.

4.3 Security

Theorem 1. *If the dealer D can not compute γ, the VMSS scheme described in Section 4.2 is secure. That is, the VMSS scheme satisfies Definition 1 and Definition 2.*

We provide the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A. According to Theorem 1, we can get the following lemma.

Lemma 1. *The VMSS scheme satisfies the following properties in the presence of an adversary that corrupts at most $t - l + 1$ participants and can not compute γ:*

1. *If the dealer is honest in the protocol, all shares owned by the honest participants can interpolate to a unique polynomial of degree t. In particular, any $t + 1$ shares of the honest participants can effectively reconstruct the secret set $S = \{s_1, ...s_l\}$.*
2. *The public information generated in the protocol can be used to check the correctness of each share. Therefore, even in the presence of a malicious adversary that corrupts at most $t-l+1$ participants, it is possible to reconstruct the secret set S from any subset that contains at least $t + 1$ correct shares.*
3. *The view of the adversary and the secret set S are independent of each other.*

5 Distributed Multi-key Generation for the Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme

In this section, we describe the threat model, security requirements, construction, and security proof of the DMKG protocol.

5.1 Threat Model and Security Requirements

Threat Model. We assume that there are n probabilistic polynomial-time participants $P_1, ...P_n$ in the DMKG protocol. These participants are in a fully synchronous network. All participants have a common broadcast channel, and there is a private point-to-point channel between the participants. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is static. That is, the corrupted participants must be chosen by the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ at the beginning of the DMKG protocol. The adversary can corrupt at most $t-1$ participants in any way, where $t-1 < n/2$.

Security Requirements The DMKG protocol is used to generate the public-private key pair (pk, sk) in the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, where $pk = (c_1, c_2, c_3) = (g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, g_1^{z})$ and $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$. The DMKG protocol is secure with threshold t if it satisfies the following requirements in the presence of the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that corrupts at most $t-1$ participants (cf. [15]).

1. **Correctness**
   (P1). Any subset of t + 1 shares provided by honest participants can determine the same private key $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$.
   (P2). There is an effective algorithm that on input the participants' n shares and public messages generated by the DMKG protocol, outputs the unique private key sk, even if at most $t-1$ shares are generated by the corrupted participants.
   (P3). All honest participants have the same public key $pk = (c_1, c_2, c_3) = (g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, g_1^{z})$, where (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z) is determined by P1.
   (P4). The values x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, and z of the private key are uniformly distributed in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.
2. **Secrecy**
   The adversary gets nothing about sk except for the pubic key pk. More formally, for each probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that can corrupt at most $t-1$ participants, there is a simulator $\mathcal{O}$ such that on input the public key pk, the output distribution produced by the simulator $\mathcal{O}$ is indistinguishable from the adversary's view in the real DMKG protocol that outputs the public key pk.

5.2 Construction

We assume that a trusted authority has chosen $g_1, h_1, g_2, h_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, where $h_1 = g_1^{\gamma_1}$ and $h_2 = g_2^{\gamma_2}$ for $\gamma_1, \gamma_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. The DMKG protocol consists of two phases of generating the private key $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$ and generating the public key $pk = (c_1 = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, c_2 = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, c_3 = g_1^{z})$. The above two phases are presented in detail in Figure 3 and Figure 4. The key ideas are described below.

In generating the private key sk phase, for each $i = 1, ..., n$, P_i randomly chooses the components x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i of sk in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The distribution process of z_i uses the Pedersen-VSS scheme [25], which is the same as the DKG protocol [15]. P_i randomly chooses a t-degree polynomial $H_i(x)$ satisfying $H_i(0) = z_i$

to distribute z_i. We use the VMSS protocol to distribute $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i})$. Specifically, P_i first broadcasts the commitments of x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, and y_{2i}. Then, P_i commits to two polynomials $F_i(x), G_i(x)$ of degree t such that $F_i(-1) = x_{1i}$, $F_i(-2) = y_{1i}$, $G_i(-1) = x_{2i}$, and $G_i(-2) = y_{2i}$. Finally, P_i broadcasts the product of two polynomial commitments so that other participants can verify the shares sent by P_i and the commitments on x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, and y_{2i} (Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 in Figure 3). At the end of this phase, P_i obtains a set of qualified participants Q_{final}, and holds the values $F_j(i)$, $G_j(i)$, and $H_j(i)$ for $j \in Q_{final}$.

In generating the public key pk phase, each participant P_i broadcasts the components $c_{1i} = g_1^{x_{1i}} g_2^{x_{2i}}$, $c_{2i} = g_1^{y_{1i}} g_2^{y_{2i}}$, and $c_{3i} = g_1^{z_i} = g_1^{H_i(0)}$ of pk for $i \in Q_{final}$. The verification process of c_{3i} is the same as the DKG protocol [15]. P_i broadcasts the public values A_{ik} for $k = 0, ..., t$, so that other participants can verify (c_{1i}, c_{2i}) through A_{ik}, and verify A_{ik} via the shares sent by P_i (Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 in Figure 4).

5.3 Security

Theorem 2. *The DMKG protocol described in Figure 3 and Figure 4 is a secure protocol for distributed multi-key generation in the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. That is, it satisfies correctness and secrecy requirements in the presence of an adversary that corrupts at most* $t - 1$ *participants for any* $t - 1 < n/2$.

A simulator $\mathcal{O}$ is provided in Figure 5. We provide the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B.

6 A Blockchain Traceable Scheme with Oversight Function

In this section, we describe the threat model, goal, construction and security of BTSOF.

6.1 Threat Model and Goal

From Section 3, it can be seen that BTSOF is constructed by adding oversight measures to SkyEye [20]. That is, the traceable public-private key pair is generated by the committee through the DMKG protocol, and the regulator must obtain the consent of the committee to enable tracing. These measures are relatively independent of SkyEye. Therefore, in BTSOF, we only consider the threat model that is same as the threat model in the DMKG protocol except that the set $(P_1, ..., P_n)$ is called a committee and n is equal to $3t - 2$. Because the adversary controls at most $t - 1$ committee members, the honest members are the majority on the committee. Moreover, we assume that the regulator can receive each committee member' reply at time t_{rep}. The goal of BTSOF is to ensure that the regulator must obtain the consent of the committee to enable tracing, and can only trace the data set sent to the committee.

1. Each participant P_i performs the following operations for $i = 1, ..., n$:

(a) P_i randomly chooses $x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, and $\beta_{0i}, \beta_{1i}, \beta_{2i}, \beta_{3i}, \beta_{4i} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Then, P_i broadcasts $E_{1i} = g_1^{x_{1i}} h_1^{\beta_{1i}}$, $E_{2i} = g_1^{y_{1i}} h_1^{\beta_{2i}}$, $E_{3i} = g_2^{x_{2i}} h_2^{\beta_{3i}}$, and $E_{4i} = g_2^{y_{2i}} h_2^{\beta_{4i}}$.

(b) P_i randomly chooses two polynomials $F_i(x), F'_i(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$ of degree t such that $F_i(-1) = x_{1i}, F_i(-2) = y_{1i}, F'_i(-1) = \beta_{1i}$ and $F'_i(-2) = \beta_{2i}$. Let $F_i(x) = a_{i0} + a_{i1}x + ... + a_{it}x^t$ and $F'_i(x) = b_{i0} + b_{i1}x + ... + b_{it}x^t$.
Then, P_i randomly chooses two polynomials $G_i(x), G'_i(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$ of degree t such that $G_i(-1) = x_{2i}, G_i(-2) = y_{2i}, G'_i(-1) = \beta_{3i}$ and $G'_i(-2) = \beta_{4i}$. Let $G_i(x) = a'_{i0} + a'_{i1}x + ... + a'_{it}x^t$ and $G'_i(x) = b'_{i0} + b'_{i1}x + ... + b'_{it}x^t$.
Finally, P_i randomly chooses two polynomials $H_i(x), H'_i(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$ of degree t such that $H_i(0) = z_i$ and $H'_i(0) = \beta_{0i}$. Let $H_i(x) = a''_{i0} + a''_{i1}x + ... + a''_{it}x^t$ and $H'_i(x) = b''_{i0} + b''_{i1}x + ... + b''_{it}x^t$, where $a''_{i0} = z_i$ and $b''_{i0} = \beta_{0i}$.
P_i broadcasts $CM_{ik} = g_1^{a_{ik}} h_1^{b_{ik}} g_2^{a'_{ik}} h_2^{b'_{ik}}$ and $cm_{ik} = g_1^{a''_{ik}} h_1^{b''_{ik}}$ for $k = 0, ...t$, where $cm_{i0} = g_1^{a''_{i0}} h_1^{b''_{i0}} = g_1^{z_i} h_1^{\beta_{0i}}$.

(c) For each $i = 1, ..., n$, Each participant P_j verifies $E_{\tau i}$ for $\tau = 1, 2, 3, 4$ and tests if

$$E_{\tau i} E_{\tau+2,i} = \prod_{k=0}^{t} (CM_{ik}^{(-\tau)^k}) \; for \; \tau = 1, 2 \tag{3}$$

If this check does not hold for an index i, P_i is marked as disqualified. Because $E_{\tau i}$ is public for $\tau = 1, 2, 3, 4$, each participant can build the set of qualified participants Q_{tem}. In particular, all honest participants build the same set Q_{tem}.

(d) For each $i \in Q_{tem}$, P_i computes the shares $sf_{ij} = F_i(j), sf'_{ij} = F'_i(j), sg_{ij} = G_i(j), sg'_{ij} = G'_i(j), sh_{ij} = H_i(j)$, and $sh'_{ij} = H'_i(j)$ for $j = 1, ..., n$. Then, P_i sends $(sf_{ij}, sf'_{ij}, sg_{ij}, sg'_{ij}, sh_{ij}, sh'_{ij})$ secretly to participant P_j for $j = 1, ..., n$. (All honest participants refuse to accept the shares of these participants who are not in Q_{tem})

(e) Each participant P_j verifies the shares received from the other participants. For each $i \in Q_{tem}$, P_j checks if

$$\begin{cases} g_1^{sf_{ij}} h_1^{sf'_{ij}} g_2^{sg_{ij}} h_2^{sg'_{ij}} = \prod_{k=0}^{t} (CM_{ik})^{j^k} \\ g_1^{sh_{ij}} h_1^{sh'_{ij}} = \prod_{k=0}^{t} (cm_{ik})^{j^k} \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

If the check fails for an index i, P_j broadcasts a complaint against P_i.

(f) For each $i \in Q_{tem}$, if P_i received a complaint from P_j, P_i broadcasts the values $sf_{ij}, sf'_{ij}, sg_{ij}, sg'_{ij}, sh_{ij}, sh'_{ij}$ that satisfy Eq. 4.

(g) A participant P_i is marked as disqualified for $i \in Q_{tem}$, if either of the following two conditions is satisfied:
   - the number of complaints against P_i is more than $t - 1$ in Step 1e.
   - The values broadcast by P_i in Step 1f do not satisfy Eq. 4.

2. Each participant in Q_{tem} builds the final set of qualified participants Q_{final}. In particular, all honest participants build the same set Q_{final}.
3. For each $i = 1, ..., n$, P_i computes the shares $sf_i = \sum_{j \in Q_{final}} sf_{ji} \; mod \; q$, $sf'_i = \sum_{j \in Q_{final}} sf'_{ji} \; mod \; q$, $sg_i = \sum_{j \in Q_{final}} sg_{ji} \; mod \; q$, $sg'_i = \sum_{j \in Q_{final}} sg'_{ji} \; mod \; q$, $sh_i = \sum_{j \in Q_{final}} sh_{ji} \; mod \; q$, and $sh'_i = \sum_{j \in Q_{final}} sh'_{ji} \; mod \; q$. The private key sk is not computed by any party, but sk is equals to $(x_1 = \sum_{i \in Q_{final}} x_{1i} \; mod \; q, x_2 = \sum_{i \in Q_{final}} x_{2i} \; mod \; q, y_1 = \sum_{i \in Q_{final}} y_{1i} \; mod \; q, y_2 = \sum_{i \in Q_{final}} y_{2i} \; mod \; q, z = \sum_{i \in Q_{final}} z_i \; mod \; q)$.

Fig. 3. Generating the private key $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$

4. For each $i \in Q_{final}$, P_i broadcasts $A_{ik} = g_1^{a_{ik}} g_2^{a'_{ik}}$, $A'_{ik} = g_1^{a''_{ik}}$ for $k = 0, ..., t$, $c_{1i} = g_1^{x_{1i}} g_2^{x_{2i}}$, and $c_{2i} = g_1^{y_{1i}} g_2^{y_{2i}}$. Let $c_{3i} = A'_{i0} = g_1^{a''_{i0}} = g_1^{z_i}$.
5. For each $j \in Q_{final}$, P_j goes through the following two steps to check whether the values broadcast by other participants in Q_{final} are correct.

(a) For each $i \in Q_{final}$, P_j checks if

$$c_{\tau i} = \prod_{k=0}^{t} (A_{ik}^{(-\tau)^k}) \ for \ \tau = 1, 2 \tag{5}$$

If the check fails for an index i, P_j broadcasts the shares $(sf_{ij}, sg_{ij}, sh_{ij})$. Because A_{ik} and $c_{\tau i}$ for $\tau = 1, 2$ are public, all honest participants broadcast the shares sent by P_i. Therefore, the number of shares exceeds the threshold t, and all honest participants can reconstruct $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$.

(b) If the check succeeds in 5a for an index i, P_j then checks if

$$\begin{cases} g_1^{sf_{ij}} g_2^{sg_{ij}} = \prod_{k=0}^{t} (A_{ik})^{j^k} \\ \quad g_1^{sh_{ij}} \quad = \prod_{k=0}^{t} (A'_{ik})^{j^k} \end{cases} \tag{6}$$

If the check fails for an index i, P_j complains against P_i by broadcasting the shares $sf_{ij}, sf'_{ij}, sg_{ij}, sg'_{ij}, sh_{ij}, sh'_{ij}$ that satisfy Eq. 4 but do not satisfy Eq. 6.

6. If there is at least one valid complaint about P_i, then the other participants in Q_{final} reconstruct $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$, A_{ik}, and A'_{ik} for $k = 0, ..., t$.
Finally, the participants in Q_{final} can obtain $pk = (c_1 = \prod_{i \in Q_{final}} c_{1i} = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, c_2 = \prod_{i \in Q_{final}} c_{2i} = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, c_3 = \prod_{i \in Q_{final}} c_{3i} = g_1^{z})$.

Fig. 4. Generating the public key $pk = (c_1 = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, c_2 = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, c_3 = g_1^{z})$

Let $corr = \{1, ..., t'\}$ denote the set of corrupted participants controlled by the adversary where $t' \leq t-1$ and $uncorr = \{t'+1, ..., n\}$ denote the set of honest participants controlled by the simulator $\mathcal{O}$.
Input: $c_1 = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, c_2 = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, c_3 = g_1^{z}$
1. $\mathcal{O}$ performs the steps 1-2 in Figure 3 on behalf of the honest participants in the set $uncorr$. At the end of step 2, the following results are satisfied:

(a) Q_{final} is correctly defined, and $uncorr \subseteq Q_{final}$. Moreover, $F_i(x)$, $F'_i(x)$, $G_i(x)$, $G'_i(x)$, $H_i(x)$, and $H'_i(x)$ for $i \in uncorr$ are randomly chosen.
(b) The view of the adversary contains $F_i(x)$,$F'_i(x)$,$G_i(x)$,$G'_i(x)$,$H_i(x)$,$H'_i(x)$ for $i \in corr$, the shares $(sf_{ij}, sf'_{ij}, sg_{ij}, sg'_{ij}, sh_{ij}, sh'_{ij})$ for $i \in Q_{final}$, $j \in corr$, and all public values $E_{\tau i}$, CM_{ik}, cm_{ik} for $i \in Q_{final}$, $\tau = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $k = 0, ..., t$.
(c) Because $\mathcal{O}$ receives enough consistent shares from the adversary, then $\mathcal{O}$ can computes all polynomials of the participants in Q_{final}. Therefore, the view of $\mathcal{O}$ consists of all shares $(sf_{ij}, sf'_{ij}, sg_{ij}, sg'_{ij}, sh_{ij}, sh'_{ij})$, all coefficients $a_{ik}, b_{ik}, a'_{ik}, b'_{ik}, a''_{ik}, b''_{ik}$ and all public values $E_{\tau i}$, CM_{ik}, cm_{ik} for $i \in Q_{final}$, $j = 1, ...n$, $\tau = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $k = 0, ..., t$.

2. Then, $\mathcal{O}$ performs the following steps:

(a) $\mathcal{O}$ sets $A^*_{ik} = A_{ik} = g_1^{a_{ik}} g_2^{a'_{ik}}$, $A'^*_{ik} = A'_{ik} = g_1^{a''_{ik}}$, $c^*_{1i} = c_{1i} = g_1^{x_{1i}} g_2^{x_{2i}}$, $c^*_{2i} = c_{2i} = g_1^{y_{1i}} g_2^{y_{2i}}$, and $c^*_{3i} = A'_{i0} = g_1^{a''_{i0}}$ for $i \in Q_{final} \setminus \{n\}$, $k = 0, ..., t$.
(b) $\mathcal{O}$ computes $c^*_{3n} = c_3 \prod_{i \in Q_{final} \setminus \{n\}} c_{3i}^{-1} = g_1^{\widehat{z}_n}$, $c^*_{1n} = c_1 \prod_{i \in Q_{final} \setminus \{n\}} c_{1i}^{-1} = g_1^{\widehat{x}_{1n}} g_2^{\widehat{x}_{2n}}$, and $c^*_{2n} = c_2 \prod_{i \in Q_{final} \setminus \{n\}} c_{2i}^{-1} = g_1^{\widehat{y}_{1n}} g_2^{\widehat{y}_{2n}}$. ($\mathcal{O}$ does not know the values $\widehat{z}_n, \widehat{x}_{1n}, \widehat{x}_{2n}, \widehat{y}_{1n}, \widehat{y}_{2n}$)
(c) $\mathcal{O}$ sets $sf^*_{nj} = sf_{nj}, sg^*_{nj} = sg_{nj}$ for $j = 1, ..., t-1$, and $sh^*_{nj} = sh_{nj}$ for $j = 1, ..., t$.
(d) The point set $((-1, \widehat{x}_{1n}), (-2, \widehat{y}_{1n}), (1, sf^*_{n1}), ..., (t-1, sf^*_{n,t-1}))$ can determine a polynomial $F^*_n(x)$ of degree t, and the point set $((-1, \widehat{x}_{2n}), (-2, \widehat{y}_{2n}), (1, sg^*_{n1}), ..., (t-1, sg^*_{n,t-1}))$ can also determine a polynomial $G^*_n(x)$ of degree t. Let $F^*_n(x) = a^*_{n0} + a^*_{n1}x + ... + a^*_{nt}x^t$ and $G^*_n(x) = a'^*_{n0} + a'^*_{n1}x + ... + a'^*_{nt}x^t$.
According to the Lagrange interpolation formula, each coefficient of the polynomials $F^*_n(x)$ and $G^*_n(x)$ is the linear combination of $(\widehat{x}_{1n}, \widehat{y}_{1n}, sf^*_{n1}, ..., sf^*_{n,t-1})$ and $(\widehat{x}_{2n}, \widehat{y}_{2n}, sg^*_{n1}, ..., sg^*_{n,t-1})$, respectively. Because the abscissas of the above two point sets are the same, the scalars of the two linear combinations of (a_{nk}, a'^*_{nk}) are the same for $k = 0, ...t$. That is, if $a_{nk} = \lambda_{k,-1}\widehat{x}_{1n} + \lambda_{k,-2}\widehat{y}_{1n} + \lambda_{k1} sf^*_{n1} + ... + \lambda_{k,t-1} sf^*_{n,t-1}$, where $\lambda_{k,-1}, \lambda_{k,-2}, \lambda_{k1}, ..., \lambda_{k,t-1}$ are corresponding scalars for $k = 0, ..., t$, then $a'^*_{nk} = \lambda_{k,-1}\widehat{x}_{2n} + \lambda_{k,-2}\widehat{y}_{2n} + \lambda_{k1} sg^*_{n1} + ... + \lambda_{k,t-1} sg^*_{n,t-1}$.
Therefore, $\mathcal{O}$ can computes $A^*_{nk} = \prod_{\tau=1}^{2} (c^*_{\tau n})^{\lambda_{k,-\tau}} \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} (g_1^{sf^*_{nj}} g_2^{sg^*_{nj}})^{\lambda_{kj}}$ for $k = 0, ..., t$.
The point set $((0, \widehat{z}_n), (1, sh^*_{n1}), ..., (t, sh^*_{nt}))$ can determine a polynomial $H^*_n(x)$. According to the Lagrange interpolation formula, each coefficient of the polynomial $H^*_n(x)$ is a linear combination of $(\widehat{z}_n, sh^*_{n1}, ..., sf^*_{nt})$. Therefore, $\mathcal{O}$ sets $A'^*_{n0} = c^*_{3n}$, and computes $A'^*_{nk} = (c^*_{3n})^{\lambda'_{k0}} \prod_{j=1}^{t} (g_1^{sh^*_{nj}})^{\lambda'_{kj}}$ where $\lambda'_{k0}, ..., \lambda'_{kt}$ are corresponding scalars for $k = 1, ..., t$.
(e) $\mathcal{O}$ broadcasts A_{ik}, A'_{ik} for $i \in Q_{final} \setminus \{n\}$ and A^*_{nk}, A'^*_{nk} for $k = 0, ..., t$.
(f) $\mathcal{O}$ performs the verifications of Eq. 5 on the values c_{1i}, c_{2i}, A_{ik} for $i \in corr$, $k = 0, ..., t$ on behalf of all honest participants. If the verification fails for some $i \in corr$, $\mathcal{O}$ reconstructs the secrets $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$.
(g) $\mathcal{O}$ performs the verifications of Eq. 6 on the values A_{ik}, A'_{ik} for $i \in corr$, $k = 0, ..., t$ on behalf of each honest participant. If the verification fails for some $i \in corr$, $j \in uncorr$, $\mathcal{O}$ broadcasts a complaint $sf_{ij}, sf'_{ij}, sg_{ij}, sg'_{ij}, sh_{ij}, sh'_{ij}$ that satisfy Eq. 4 but do not satisfy Eq. 6.
(h) $\mathcal{O}$ performs the step 6 in Figure 4 on behalf of the honest participants.

Fig. 5. Simulator $\mathcal{O}$

6.2 Construction

We modify the *Setup* and *Trace* algorithms in SkyEye and keep the other algorithms unchanged. We add the step of generating the common reference string *crs* for non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to the *Setup* algorithm, and leave the process of generating the traceable public-private key pair in the *Setup* algorithm to the committee. Let the committee use the DMKG protocol to periodically generate the traceable public-private key pair. We modify the *Trace* algorithm to the interaction between the committee and the regulator to ensure that the regulator only trace the data set sent to the committee.

Without loss of generality, we analyze the interaction between the committee and regulator in one period. Let T denote one period and (pk_{reg}, sk_{reg}) denote the traceable public-private key pair in this period. Let Q_{final} denote the set of qualified members in the committee's process of generating (pk_{reg}, sk_{reg}) in this period. For each $i \in Q_{final}$, P_i has the public-private key pair (pk_{sig_i}, sk_{sig_i}) of the signature scheme, the traceable private key component $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$, and the traceable public key component $(c_{1i}, c_{2i}, c_{3i}) = (g_1^{x_{1i}} g_2^{x_{2i}}, g_1^{y_{1i}} g_2^{y_{2i}}, g_1^{z_i})$. The operations of the committee and the regulator are presented in detail in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The key ideas are described below.

The regulator broadcasts a message to the committee to indicate the data set it wants to trace. The message has two types:

• The message $m_{rtc} = (R, dw) = (R, (data_l, wit_l)_{l \in \{1,...,len\}})$ indicates that the regulator wants to trace the data set with len elements, where R denotes the identifier of the regulator, and $(data_l, wit_l)$ denotes the l-th data and the corresponding evidence for $l \in \{1, ..., len\}$.

• The message $m_{rtc} = (R, dw) = (R, (T, wit_T))$ indicates that the regulator wants to trace all data of the T period, where R denotes the identifier of the regulator and wit_T denotes the corresponding evidence.

After receiving the above message m_{rtc}, for each $i \in Q_{final}$, P_i verifies the correctness of the corresponding evidence in m_{rtc}. If the verification is successful, P_i signs dw in the message m_{rtc}, and sends the signature to the regulator.

Every time a signature is received from a committee member, the regulator verifies the signature and keeps it in the set *sigall* if the verification is successful. Finally, if the size of *sigall* is greater than or equal to t, the regulator broadcasts the message $m_{rtc} = (R, dw, sigall)$ to the committee.

After receiving the above message $m_{rtc} = (R, dw, sigall)$, each committee member in Q_{final} first verifies each signature in the set *sigall*, and counts the number of valid signature. If the number is greater than or equal to t, the committee members in Q_{final} perform the following processing.

- If $m_{rtc} = (R, (T, wit_T), sigall)$, the members in Q_{final} construct the private key sk_{reg}. For each $i \in Q_{final}$, P_i sends the message $m_i = sk_{reg}$ to the regulator.
- If $m_{rtc} = (R, (data_l, wit_l)_{l \in \{1,...,len\}}, sigall)$, let C denote the ciphertext set about the users' chameleon hash public keys in the data set. For each ciphertext $C_k = (u_{k1}, u_{k2}, e_k, v_k) \in C$, P_i computes $u_{ik1} = u_{k1}^{(x_{1i}+y_{1i}\alpha_k)} =$

For each $i \in Q_{final}$, P_i performs the following steps upon receiving m_{rtc} sent by the regulator.

1. P_i sets $num = 0$;
2. If $m_{rtc} = (R, dw) = (R, (data_l, wit_l)_{l\in\{1,\dots,len\}})$ or $m_{rtc} = (R, dw) = (R, (T, wit_T))$, P_i first checks the correctness of dw. If this check is successful, P_i then computes the signature $\sigma_i = Sig.sign(sk_{sig_i}, dw)$, sets $m_i = (dw, \sigma_i)$ and sends m_i to the regulator.
3. If $m_{rtc} = (R, (T, wit_T), sigall)$, for each $\sigma_j \in sigall$, P_i first computes $b = Sig.verify(pk_{sig_j}, dw, \sigma_j)$, and sets $num = num{+}1$ if b=1. Finally, if $num >= t$, P_i publishes the share (sf_i, sg_i, sh_i). Because the number of the honest participants is in the majority in the set Q_{final}, according to the second property of correctness of the DMKG protocol, P_i can receive enough correct shares to construct the private key sk_{reg} and send the message $m_i = sk_{reg}$ to the regulator.
4. If $m_{rtc} = (R, (data_l, wit_l)_{l\in\{1,\dots,len\}}, sigall)$, for each $\sigma_j \in sigall$, P_i first computes $b = Sig.verify(pk_{sig_j}, dw, \sigma_j)$, and sets $num = num + 1$ if b=1. Finally, if $num >= t$, P_i performs the following steps.
   (a) P_i extracts the ciphertext of each user's chameleon hash public key from the $(data_l)_{l\in\{1,\dots,len\}}$ and obtains the ciphertext set C.
   (b) For each $C_k = (u_{k1}, u_{k2}, e_k, v_k) = (g_1^{r_k}, g_2^{r_k}, c_3^{r_k m}, c_1^{r_k} c_2^{r_k \alpha_k}) \in C$ where r_k is a random number used for encryption and $\alpha_k = H(u_{k1}, u_{k2}, e_k)$, P_i computes:
$$u_{ik1} = u_{k1}^{(x_{1i}+y_{1i}\alpha_k)} = g_1^{r_k(x_{1i}+y_{1i}\alpha_k)},$$
$$u_{ik2} = u_{k2}^{(x_{2i}+y_{2i}\alpha_k)} = g_2^{r_k(x_{2i}+y_{2i}\alpha_k)},$$
$$u_{ik3} = u_{k1}^{z_i} = g_1^{r_k z_i}$$
   Then, P_i computes $\pi_i = NIZK.P((u_{ik1}, u_{ik2}, u_{ik3}, C_k, c_{1i}, c_{2i}, c_{3i}), (x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i))$, and broadcasts $(statement_i, \pi_i)$, where $statement_i = (u_{ik1}, u_{ik2}, u_{ik3}, C_k, c_{1i}, c_{2i}, c_{3i})$.
   (c) For $(statement_j, \pi_j)$ broadcast by P_j for each $j \in Q_{final}$, P_i first checks if $(c_{1j}, c_{2j}, c_{3j}) \in statement_i$ matches the values received in the DMKG protocol. If the check passes, P_i then computes $b = NIZK.V(statement_j, \pi_j)$. If $b = 0$ for an index j, P_i broadcasts the shares $(sf_{ji}, sg_{ji}, sh_{ji})$. Because each committee member in Q_{final} checks the $(u_{jk1}, u_{jk2}, u_{jk3}, C_k, c_{1j}, c_{2j}, c_{3j}, \pi_j)$, then if P_i is honest, the number of shares about P_j exceeds the threshold t, and all honest participants can reconstruct $(x_{1j}, x_{2j}, y_{1j}, y_{2j}, z_j)$.
   (d) For each $C_k \in C$, P_i computes
$$\begin{aligned} u_{ik12} &= \Pi_{j\in Q_{final}} u_{jk1} u_{jk2} = \Pi_{j\in Q_{final}} g_1^{r_k(x_{1j}+y_{1j}\alpha_k)} g_2^{r_k(x_{2j}+y_{2j}\alpha_k)} \\ &= g_1^{r_k(\Sigma_{j\in Q_{final}} x_{1j} + \alpha_k \Sigma_{j\in Q_{final}} y_{1j})} g_2^{r_k(\Sigma_{j\in Q_{final}} x_{2j} + \alpha_k \Sigma_{j\in Q_{final}} y_{2j})} \\ &= g_1^{r_k(x_1+y_1\alpha_k)} g_2^{r_k(x_2+y_2\alpha_k)} = u_{k1}^{x_1+y_1\alpha_k} u_{k2}^{x_2+y_2\alpha_k}; \\ u_{ik13} &= \Pi_{j\in Q_{final}} u_{jk3} = g_1^{r_k \Sigma_{j\in Q_{final}} z_j} = g_1^{r_k z} = u_{k1}^{z}. \end{aligned}$$
   (e) Finally, P_i sends $m_i = (u_{ik12}, u_{ik13})_{k\in(1,\dots,|C|)}$ to the regulator.

Fig. 6. Committee Member Operations

$g_1^{r_k(x_{1i}+y_{1i}\alpha_k)}$, $u_{ik2} = u_{k2}^{(x_{2i}+y_{2i}\alpha_k)} = g_2^{r_k(x_{2i}+y_{2i}\alpha_k)}$, and $u_{ik3} = u_{k1}^{z_i} = g_1^{r_k z_i}$, where r_k is a random number used for encryption and $\alpha_k = H(u_{k1}, u_{k2}, e_k)$. In order to allow the other committee members to verify that u_{ik1}, u_{ik2}, and u_{ik3} are indeed generated by $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$, we use non-interactive zero-knowledge technology to produce the proof π_i, which proves that "I know $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$ that can generate $(u_{ik1}, u_{ik2}, u_{ik3})$ and (c_{1i}, c_{2i}, c_{3i})". Finally, P_i broadcasts $(statment_i, \pi_i)$, where $statment_i = (u_{ik1}, u_{ik2}, u_{ik3}, C_k, c_{1i}, c_{2i}, c_{3i})$.

For each $j \in Q_{final}$, P_i verifies $(statment_j, \pi_j)$. If the verification fails for some index j and P_i is honest, all honest members can reconstruct $(x_{1j}, x_{2j}, y_{1j}, y_{2j}, z_j)$.

Therefore, P_i can compute $u_{ik12} = \Pi_{j\in Q_{final}} u_{jk1}u_{jk2} = u_{k1}^{x_1+y_1\alpha_k} u_{k2}^{x_2+y_2\alpha_k}$ and $u_{ik13} = \Pi_{j\in Q_{final}} u_{jk3} = u_{k1}^{z}$. Finally, P_i sends $m_i = (u_{ik12}, u_{ik13})_{k\in(1,\ldots,|C|)}$ to the regulator.

After receiving the message m_i sent by P_i for $i \in Q_{final}$, the regulator chooses the value that is in the majority in these messages, and achieves tracing according to the value.

6.3 Security

We briefly describe the security of the scheme. If the size of the signature set *sigall* provided by the regulator to the committee is greater than or equal to t (the adversary controls at most t-1 participants), this means that at least one honest participant agrees the message $m_{rtc} = (R, dw)$ that is previously sent by the regulator. Because the message $m_{rtc} = (R, dw)$ is public, this means that all honest participants that are in the majority on the committee have also agreed. That is, the majority of the members of the committee agree with the regulator tracing the data set in m_{rtc}.

When the regulator does not trace all data of the T period, for each $i \in Q_{final}$, after generating $(u_{ik1}, u_{ik2}, u_{ik3})$, P_i use non-interactive zero-knowledge technique to guarantee that other committee members can verify the correctness of $(u_{ik1}, u_{ik2}, u_{ik3})$ and can not obtain the $(x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i)$.

Finally, the message $m_i = (u_{ik12}, u_{ik13})_{k\in(1,\ldots,|C|)}$ sent by each member does not contain any information about the private key sk. Therefore, the regulator only trace the data set that it sends. Moreover, because the honest members are in the majority of the committee, the value that is in the majority in these messages can ensure that the regulator can trace the data set.

7 Related Work

Blockchain research focuses primarily on privacy [5, 8, 22, 26], efficiency [11, 28], security [12, 19], and its applications in other fields [21, 27]. However, research on traceable mechanisms is limited, and is mainly concentrated in the field of cryptocurrencies.

The regulator performs the following steps:

1. The regulator sets $num = 0$, $ID = \varnothing$, $Q_{rsig} = \varnothing$, $Q_{rsk} = \varnothing$, and $sigall = \varnothing$.
2. The regulator creates $m_{rtc} = (R, dw)$, where dw is equal to (T, wit_T) or $(data_l, wit_l)_{l \in \{1,\dots,len\}}$, and broadcasts m_{rtc} to the committee.
3. The regulator receives each committee member's reply about $m_{rtc} = (R, dw)$ at time t_{rep}, and adds each reply to the set Q_{rsig}.
4. For each committee member's reply $m_i = (dw, \sigma_i) \in Q_{rsig}$ where dw is equal to (T, wit_T) or $(data_l, wit_l)_{l \in \{1,\dots,len\}}$, and σ_i denotes the signature of dw, the regulator verifies the signature $b = Sig.verify(pk_{sig_i}, dw, \sigma_i)$. If $b = 1$, the regulator sets $num = num + 1$ and $sigall = sigall \bigcup \sigma_i$.
5. If $num >= t$, the regulator sets $m_{rtc} = (R, dw, sigall)$, and broadcasts m_{rtc} to the committee; otherwise, the regulator aborts operation.
6. The regulator receives each committee member's reply about $m_{rtc} = (R, dw, sigall)$ at time t_{rep}, and adds each reply to the set Q_{rsk}.
7. If the number of some same value is in the majority in Q_{rsk} where the same value is denoted by m_f, the regulator continues with the following steps.
8. If $m_f = (u_{ik12}, u_{ik13})_{k \in (1,\dots,|C|)}$ for some $i \in Q_{final}$, for each $c_k = (u_{k1}, u_{k2}, e_k, v_k) \in C$, the regulator checks if $u_{ik12} = v_k$. If the check passes, the regulator computes $pk_{c_k} = e_k / u_{ik13}$, searches his database to determine the true identity id_k corresponding to the chameleon hash pubic key pk_{c_k}, and sets $ID = ID \bigcup id_k$.
9. If $m_f = sk_{reg} = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$, for each $c_k = (u_{k1}, u_{k2}, e_k, v_k) \in C$, the regulator computes $\alpha_k = H(u_{k1}, u_{k2}, e_k)$ and checks if $u_{k1}^{x_1 + y_1 \alpha_k} u_{k2}^{x_2 + y_2 \alpha_k} = v_k$. If the check passes, the regulator computes $pk_{c_k} = e_k / u_{k1}^{z}$, searches his database to determine the true identity id_k corresponding to the chameleon hash pubic key pk_{c_k}, and sets $ID = ID \bigcup id_k$.
10. Finally the regulator obtains the users' identity set ID.

Fig. 7. Regulator Operations

Ateniese and Faonio [3] proposed a scheme for Bitcoin. In their scheme, a user is certifiable if it obtains certified Bitcoin address from a trusted certificate authority. The regulator can determine the certifiable users' identities in the Bitcoin transactions via the certificate authority. Garman, Green and Miers [14] constructed a new decentralized anonymous payment system based on Zerocash [5]. Their scheme achieves tracing by adding privacy preserving policy-enforcement mechanisms.

Narula, Vasquez, and Virza [24] designed the first distributed ledger system, which is called zkLedger. zkLedger can provide strong privacy protection, public verifiability, and practical auditing. Their scheme is mainly used for auditing digital asset transactions over some banks. The ledger exists in the form of a table in zkLedger. Each user's identity corresponds to each column in the table. Therefore, the regulator can determine each users identity according to the correspondence between each column and the identity of each user in the table.

Defrawy and Lampkins [10] proposed a proactively-private digital currency (PDC) scheme. In their scheme, the ledger is kept by a group of ledger servers. Each ledger server has two ledgers: a balance ledger and a transaction ledger. The balance ledger contains a share of each user's identity. Therefore, the regulator can trace the users' identities in transactions via these ledger servers.

Tianjun Ma et al. proposed SkyEye [20], a traceable scheme for blockchain. their scheme can be applied to a class of blockchain applications. SkyEye allows the regulator to trace the users' identities of the blockchain data. However, the regulator can arbitrarily trace the users' identities of the blockchain data without any restrictions and oversight measures in SkyEye. We propose a blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function based on SkyEye to limit the tracing right of the regulator. The regulator must obtain the consent of the committee to enable tracing.

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose BTSOF, a blockchain traceable scheme with oversight function, based on SkyEye. In BTSOF, The regulator must obtain the consent of the committee to enable tracing. The regulator can trace one data, multiple data or data in multiple period. Moreover, we construct a non-interactive verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme (VMSS scheme) and leverage the VMSS scheme to design a distributed multi-key generation (DMKG) protocol for the Cramer-Shoup public key encryption scheme. The DMKG protocol is used in the design of BTSOF. We provide the security definition and security proof of the VMSS scheme and DMKG protocol.

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A Proof of Theorem 1

Lemma 2. *Let $A \subseteq \{1, ..., n\}$ denote the participant set, where $|A| = t + 1$. If the commitment of each secret in S broadcast by the dealer D satisfies Eq. 1,* *and the share of each participant in A satisfies Eq. 2, then all participants in A can determine the set* $ST' = \{(s'_1, \beta'_1), ..., (s'_l, \beta'_l)\}$ *that satisfies* $E_i = g^{s'_i}h^{\beta'_i}$ *for* $i = 1, ..., l$.

Proof. According to the conditions, all participants in A can compute two unique polynomials f^*, f'^* of degree t via the Lagrange interpolation formula. For each $i \in A$, f^* and f'^* satisfy:

$$\begin{cases} f^*(i) = st_i \\ f'^*(i) = sh_i \end{cases}$$

The following result can be obtained from Eq. 2.

$$g^{f^*(i)+\gamma f'^*(i)} = g^{st_i+\gamma sh_i}, i \in A$$

That is, $(f^* + \gamma f'^*)(x)$ is the unique t-degree polynomial that maps i to $st_i + \gamma sh_i$.

Because $cm_j = g^{a_j}h^{b_j} = g^{a_j+\gamma b_j}$ for $j = 0, ..., t$, then $e(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{t}(a_j + \gamma b_j)x^j$ satisfies $e(i) = st_i + \gamma sh_i$ for $i \in A$.

Therefore, $e(x) = (f^* + \gamma f'^*)(x)$ and $E_i = g^{e(-i)} = g^{f^*(-i)+\gamma f'^*(-i)} = g^{f^*(-i)}h^{f'^*(-i)}$.

Finally, $s'_i = f^*(-i), \beta'_i = f'^*(-i)$ for $i = 1, ..., l$.

Theorem 3. *Assuming that the dealer D can not compute* γ*, the verification protocol* Ver_{pro} *satisfies Definition 1.*

Proof. If the dealer D and all participants follow the VMSS scheme, the secrets set S and all participants's shares satisfy Eq. 1 and 2. This means that the VMSS scheme satisfies the first requirement in Definition 1.

Let $A, A' \subseteq \{1, ..., n\}$, where $|A| = |A'| = t + 1$. All participants in A and A' have accepted their shares. Therefore, according to Lemma 2, the participants of A and A' can find $ST = ((s_1, \beta_1), ..., (s_l, \beta_l))$ and $ST' = ((s'_1, \beta'_1), ..., (s'_l, \beta'_l))$, respectively, such that $E_i = g^{s_i}h^{\beta_i} = g^{s'_i}h^{\beta'_i}$ for $i = 1, ..., l$.

All shares are consistent if and only if there is a polynomial f of degree t such that $f(i) = st_i\ for\ i = 1, ..., n$. Here, $ST = ST'$.

If the shares are inconsistent, there is $k \in \{1, ...n\}$ such that $f(k) \neq st_k$. Thus, the dealer can construct two sets $A = \{1, ..., t + 1\}$ and $A' = \{1, ...t, k\}$. This situation causes $ST \neq ST'$. Assuming that $(s_j, \beta_j) \neq (s'_j, \beta'_j)$ for some $j \in \{1, ..., l\}$, the dealer can compute $\gamma = (s_j - s'_j)/(\beta'_j - \beta_j)$ according to $E_j = g^{s_j}h^{\beta_j} = g^{s_j+\gamma\beta_j} = g^{s'_j}h^{\beta'_j} = g^{s'_j+\gamma\beta'_j}$. This contradicts the assumption.

Theorem 4. *The VMSS scheme satisfies Definition 2.*

Proof. Let the size of A is $t - l + 1$. If A does not find anything about S, then neither does the set that the size is fewer than $t - l + 1$.

Let $A = \{1, ..., k-l+1\}$ and $View_A = \{E_1, ..., E_l, cm_0, ..., cm_t, (st_i, sh_i)_{i\in A}\}$. There are two polynomials f, f' of degree t satisfying

$$\begin{cases} f(-i) = s_i,\ for\ i = 1, ..., l \\ f(i) = st_i,\ for\ i = 1, ..., t - l + 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} f'(-i) = \beta_i, \ for \ i = 1, ..., l \\ f'(i) = sh_i, \ for \ i = 1, ..., t-l+1 \end{cases}$$

Let $f(x) = a_0 + a_1x + ... + a_tx^t$ and $f'(x) = b_0 + b_1x + ... + b_tx^t$. According to the verification protocol, f and f' are chosen by the dealer, if f and f' satisfy

$$\begin{cases} E_i = g^{f(-i)}h^{f'(-i)} \ for \ i = 1, ..., l \\ cm_i = g^{a_i}h^{b_i} \ for \ i = 0, ..., t \end{cases}$$

According to Lemma 2, There is a unique polynomial e satisfy $g^{e(-i)} = g^{f(-i)}h^{f'(-i)} = g^{s_i}h^{\beta_i}$ for $i = 1, ..., l$. And according to the second property of Franklin-Yung multi-secret sharing scheme, A can not get anything about the polynomial f. That is, A can not find anything about S.

B Proof of Theorem 2

We need to use the following lemma about the Pedersen-VSS scheme [25] (cf. [15]) to prove Theorem 2. In the Pedersen-VSS scheme with threshold t, the dealer distributes the secret s to n participants $P_1, ..., P_n$. We assume that a trusted authority has chosen $g, h \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, where $h = g^\gamma, \gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ for the Pedersen-VSS scheme.

Lemma 3. *Pedersen-VSS scheme satisfies the following properties in the presence of an adversary that corrupts at most t participants and can not compute γ:*

1. *If the dealer is honest in the protocol, all shares owned by the honest participants can interpolate to a unique polynomial of degree t. In particular, any $t+1$ shares of the honest participants can effectively reconstruct the secret s.*
2. *The public information generated in the protocol can be used to check the correctness of each share. Therefore, even in the presence of a malicious adversary that corrupts at most t participants, it is possible to reconstruct secret s from any subset that contains at least $t+1$ correct shares.*
3. *The view of the adversary and the secret s are independent of each other.*

Proof of Correctness. It can been seen that according to the public broadcast information that is used to determine whether every participant is qualified, all honest participants can get the same set Q_{final}, which is defined at the end of the step 2 in Figure 3.

(P1). P_i as a dealer honestly performs the Pedersen-VSS and VMSS protocol for $i \in Q_{final}$. Therefore, according to the first property of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, all honest participants use their shares of P_i to compute three polynomials $F_i(x)$, $G_i(x)$, $H_i(x)$ such that $F_i(-1) = x_{1i}$, $F_i(-2) = y_{1i}$, $G_i(-1) = x_{2i}$, $G_i(-2) = y_{2i}$, and $H_i(0) = z_i$. Therefore, for any set $\mathcal{R}$ of $t+1$ correct shares, $x_{1i} = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{1j} sf_{ij}$, $x_{2i} = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{1j} sg_{ij}$, $y_{1i} = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{2j} sf_{ij}$,

$y_{2i} = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{2j} sg_{ij}$, and $z_i = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{0j} sh_{ij}$ where $\gamma_{0j} = \Pi_{k\in\mathcal{R},k\neq j} \frac{-k}{j-k}$, $\gamma_{1j} = \Pi_{k\in\mathcal{R},k\neq j} \frac{-1-k}{j-k}$, and $\gamma_{2j} = \Pi_{k\in\mathcal{R},k\neq j} \frac{-2-k}{j-k}$ are the Lagrange interpolation coefficients. Finally, x_1 can be generated from the shares of $\mathcal{R}$ as follows:

$$x_1 = \sum_{i\in Q_{final}} x_{1i} = \sum_{i\in Q_{final}} \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{1j} sf_{ij} = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{1j} \sum_{i\in Q_{final}} sf_{ij} = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{1j} sf_j.$$

Similarly, $x_2 = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{1j} sg_j$, $y_1 = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{2j} sf_j$, $y_2 = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{2j} sg_j$, and $z = \sum_{j\in\mathcal{R}} \gamma_{0j} sh_j$.

(P2). The shares (sf_i, sg_i, sh_i) of P_i for $i \in Q_{final}$ can be verified via the following equations.

$$\begin{cases} g_1^{sf_i} g_2^{sg_i} = g_1^{\sum_{i\in Q_{final}} sf_{ij}} g_2^{\sum_{i\in Q_{final}} sg_{ij}} = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} g_1^{sf_{ij}} g_2^{sg_{ij}} = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} \prod_{k=0}^{t} (A_{ik})^{j^k}, \\ g_1^{sh_i} = g_1^{\sum_{i\in Q_{final}} sh_{ij}} = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} g_1^{sh_{ij}} = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} \prod_{k=0}^{t} (A'_{ik})^{j^k}. \end{cases}$$

The last equality of the above two equations follows Eq. 6. Therefore, Eq. 6 makes each participant to verify the correctness of share (sf_i, sg_i, sh_i).

(P3). The public key pk is equal to (c_1, c_2, c_3), where $c_1 = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} c_{1i} = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}$, $c_2 = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} c_{2i} = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}$, and $c_3 = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} c_{3i} = g_1^{z}$. Thus, We need to prove that $c_{1i} = g_1^{x_{1i}} g_2^{x_{2i}}$, $c_{2i} = g_1^{y_{1i}} g_2^{y_{2i}}$, and $c_{3i} = g_1^{z_i}$ for each $i \in Q_{final}$.

If the public values A_{ik}, A'_{ik}, c_{1i}, and c_{2i} do not satisfy Eq. 5 or Eq. 6 for some $i \in Q_{final}$ and $k = 0, ..., t$, other participants in Q_{final} can reconstruct the values x_{1i}, x_{2i}, y_{1i}, y_{2i}, z_i of P_i according to the steps 5a and 6 in Figure 4; otherwise, these public values satisfy Eq. 5 and Eq. 6, and the values A_{ik} for $k = 0, ..., t$ define two polynomials $\widehat{F}_i(x)$, $\widehat{G}_i(x)$ of degree t. We use $F_i(x)$ and $G_i(x)$ to denote the polynomials defined by any t+1 shares of the honest participants. Then, according to the Eq. 6, it can be seen that $\widehat{F}_i(x)$ and $F_i(x)$ have at least t + 1 common points, as do $\widehat{G}_i(x)$ and $G_i(x)$. Because they are t-degree polynomials, $\widehat{F}_i(x)$ and $F_i(x)$ are same and so are $\widehat{G}_i(x)$ and $G_i(x)$. That is, $c_{1i} = g_1^{F_i(-1)} g_2^{G_i(-1)} = g_1^{x_{1i}} g_2^{x_{2i}}$, and $c_{2i} = g_1^{F_i(-2)} g_2^{G_i(-2)} = g_1^{y_{1i}} g_2^{y_{2i}}$. Similarly, $c_{i3} = g_1^{H_i(0)} = g_1^{z_i}$.

(P4). For $x_1 = \sum_{i\in Q_{final}} x_{1i}$, as long as x_{1i} for some $i \in Q_{final}$ is randomly selected, then it can be guaranteed that x_1 is randomly chosen. According to the DMKG protocol, x_1 and x_{1i} are determined by the set Q_{final}. Let P_i be a honest participant for $i \in Q_{final}$. x_{1i} is distributed by the P_i via VMSS protocol. According to the third property of Lemma 1, x_{1i} is uniformly random. Thus, x_1 is uniformly distributed. Similarly, x_2, y_1, y_2, and z are also uniformly distributed.

Proof of Secrecy. According to the Figure 5, it can be seen that the adversary's view about the data produced by the honest participants in the real DMKG protocol consists of the shares $(sf_{ij}, sf'_{ij}) = (F_i(j), F'_i(j))$, $(sg_{ij}, sg'_{ij}) = (G_i(j), G'_i(j))$, $(sh_{ij}, sh'_{ij}) = (H_i(j), H'_i(j))$ for $i \in uncorr$, $j \in corr$, and $E_{\tau i}$, CM_{ik}, cm_{ik}, A_{ik}, A'_{ik}, c_{1i}, c_{2i} for $i \in uncorr$, $\tau = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $k = 0, ..., t$.

The above distribution of the values depends on the choice of the polynomials $F_i(x), F_i'(x), G_i(x), G_i'(x), H_i(x), H_i'(x)$ for $i \in uncorr$. These polynomials satisfy

$$\begin{cases} c_1 = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} c_{1i} = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} g_1^{F_i(-1)} g_2^{G_i(-1)} = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, \\ c_2 = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} c_{2i} = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} g_1^{F_i(-2)} g_2^{G_i(-2)} = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, \\ c_3 = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} c_{3i} = \prod_{i\in Q_{final}} g_1^{H_i(0)} = g_1^{z}. \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

In other words, this distribution is induced by the choice of the polynomials $F_i(x)$, $F_i'(x)$, $G_i(x)$, $G_i'(x)$, $H_i(x)$, and $H_i'(x)$ for $i \in uncorr \setminus \{n\}$ and $F_n(x)$, $F_n'(x)$, $G_n(x)$, $G_n'(x)$, $H_n(x)$, $H_n'(x)$. The polynomials $F_n(x), G_n(x), H_n(x)$ satisfy $c_{1n} = g_1^{F_n(-1)} g_2^{G_n(-1)} = c_1 \prod_{i\in Q_{final}\setminus\{n\}} c_{1i}^{-1}$, $c_{2n} = g_1^{F_n(-2)} g_2^{G_n(-2)} = c_2 \prod_{i\in Q_{final}\setminus\{n\}} c_{2i}^{-1}$, and $c_{3n} = g_1^{H_n(0)} = c_3 \prod_{i\in Q_{f}inal\setminus\{n\}} c_{3i}^{-1}$. Moveover, this distribution depends on the set Q_{final} that is defined at the end of Step 2 in Figure 3.

Next, We prove that the probability distribution that is output by the simulator is equal to the above distribution. It can be seen that the steps 1 and 2 of the simulator $\mathcal{O}$ are identical to the steps 1 and 2 of the real DMKG protocol. Therefore, the Q_{final} that is defined in the simulator $\mathcal{O}$ is identical to the Q_{final} that is defined in the real DMKG protocol.

As show in Figure 5, the polynomials $F_i^*(x)$, $F_i'^*(x)$, $G_i^*(x)$, $G_i'^*(x)$, $H_i^*(x)$, and $H_i'^*(x)$ are identical to the polynomials $F_i(x)$, $F_i'(x)$, $G_i(x)$, $G_i'(x)$, $H_i(x)$, and $H_i'(x)$, respectively, for $i \in uncorr \setminus \{n\}$. For $i = n$, from the construction process of $A_{nk}^*, A_{nk}'^*$ of the simulator, it can be seen that $F_n^*(x)$ is defined by these values $F_n^*(-1) = \widehat{x}_{1n}$, $F_n^*(-2) = \widehat{y}_{1n}$, $F_n^*(j) = sf_{nj}^* = F_n(j)$ for $j = 1, ..., t-1$, $G_n^*(x)$ is defined by these values $G_n^*(-1) = \widehat{x}_{2n}$, $G_n^*(-2) = \widehat{y}_{2n}$, $G_n^*(j) = sg_{nj}^* = G_n(j)$ for $j = 1, ..., t-1$, and $H_n^*(x)$ is defined by these values $H_n^*(0) = \widehat{z}_n$, $H_n^*(j) = sh_{nj}^* = H_n(j)$ for $j = 1, ..., t$. Because $h_1 = g^{\gamma_1}, h_2 = g_2^{\gamma_2}$, then the polynomials $F_n'^*(x)$, $G_n'^*(x)$ and $H_n^*(x)$ are defined by the relation $F_n^*(x) + \gamma_1 F_n'^*(x) = F_n(x) + \gamma_1 F_n'(x)$, $G_n^*(x) + \gamma_2 G_n'^*(x) = G_n(x) + \gamma_2 G_n'(x)$ and $H_n^*(x) + \gamma_1 H_n'^*(x) = H_n(x) + \gamma_1 H_n'(x)$, respectively.

According to the above definition of these polynomials, we can know that the values $F_i^*(j)$, $F_i'^*(j)$, $G_i^*(j)$, $G_i'^*(j)$, $H_i^*(j)$, and $H_i'^*(j)$ are identical to the values $F_i(j)$, $F_i'(j)$, $G_i(j)$, $G_i'(j)$, $H_i(j)$, and $H_i'(j)$ for $i \in uncorr$, $j \in corr$, and the coefficients of these polynomials agree with the public values CM_{ik}, cm_{ik}, A_{ik}^*, $A_{ik}'^*$ for $i \in corr$, $k = 0, ...t$. Therefore, the values received by the adversary satisfy Eq. 3, Eq. 4, Eq. 5, and Eq. 6.

The remaining task is to prove that the polynomials $F_i^*(x)$, $F_i'^*(x)$, $G_i^*(x)$, $G_i'^*(x)$, $H_i^*(x)$, $H_i'^*(x)$ for $i \in uncorr$ are randomly chosen. Because the polynomials $F_i(x)$, $F_i'(x)$, $G_i(x)$, $G_i'(x)$, $H_i(x)$, and $H_i'(x)$ are randomly chosen for $i \in uncorr \setminus \{n\}$, So are the polynomials $F_i^*(x)$, $F_i'^*(x)$, $G_i^*(x)$, $G_i'^*(x)$, $H_i^*(x)$, and $H_i'^*(x)$ for $i \in uncorr \setminus \{n\}$. For $F_n^*(x)$, $G_n^*(x)$ and $H_n^*(x)$, the values $F_n^*(j)$, $G_n^*(j)$, and $H_n^*(k)$ are random for $j = 1, ...t-1$, $k = 1, ..., t$, and the values

$F_n^*(-1)$, $F_n^*(-2)$, $G_n^*(-1)$, $G_n^*(-2)$ and $H_n^*(0)$ satisfy Eq. 7. Therefore, $F_n^*(x)$, $G_n^*(x)$ and $H_n^*(x)$ are randomly chosen. Moreover, because $F_n'(x)$, $G_n'(x)$ and $H_n'(x)$ are random polynomials, so are $F_n'^*(x)$, $G_n'^*(x)$ and $H_n'^*(x)$ according to the definition of these polynomials.